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As research has advanced, technologies have become more closely 
knit, and the relationships between them—both complementary and 
competitive—have become increasingly important.  Unfortunately, the 
patent system’s use of monopoly power to reward innovators creates 
inefficient results by overly encouraging the development of substitute 
technologies and discouraging the development of complementary 
technologies.  This paper explains how an optional patent purchase 
system could help ameliorate such problems and discusses the 
implications of such a system.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The path to national prosperity and power has long been paved 
with technology.  Governments have recognized this, and accordingly 
have long sought to foment scientific advancement and innovation.   
But encouraging creativity presents thorny problems:  Once an 
innovator shares her idea with the world, she cannot control its 
dissemination.  The idea can then be adopted by others, eliminating any 
advantage the original inventor might have received from it.2 Developing 
an innovation is often a costly endeavor.  An inventor, knowing that she 
will not be able to profit from her invention unless she is able to keep it a 
secret, will only pursue research if she knows that she will be able to 
conceal its result.3
The concealment of knowledge that this creates is also a problem 
in itself; if other would-be innovators knew of their companion’s 
discovery, they might also have their own ideas on how to improve it, 
adapt it to new contexts, or incorporate it into their own projects.  Their 
attempts to address the same problem will likely lead them to devote 
significant resources to work that is largely duplicative of the research 
conducted by the first inventor.  But ideas are a public good, and from 
society’s perspective, there is nothing to be gained from not sharing them; 
 
2 Or, as Thomas Jefferson—the nation’s first Patent Examiner—stated more poetically:  
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of 
exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, 
which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to 
himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the 
possession of everyone, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of 
it.  
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, Aug. 13, 1813, as reprinted in 13 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 333 (1905) (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery 
Bergh, eds.). 
3 It also presents a serious obstacle for an inventor who lacks the resources to bring her 
idea to market on her own; if she hopes to partner herself with a party that possesses the 
requisite capital or other means of production, she must first share her idea.  But, in doing 
so, she is vulnerable to an unscrupulous actor who would simply appropriate the idea as 
her own.  This problem has become increasingly important as goods have become more 
technologically sophisticated.    
4informing these other innovators increases their capabilities but does not 
reduce those of the original innovator.4 Thus, from society’s perspective, 
spreading discoveries increases their value, and the failure to do so 
represents pure waste.   
Our founding fathers knew all of this, and designed our patent 
system to address these problems.  Indeed, they considered these problems 
to be of such importance that they laid the patent system’s foundation in 
our Constitution itself.5 While many of the patent system’s details have 
changed since then, both the logic and the basic concepts that animate it 
remain largely the same:  Patents reward an inventor for her innovation by 
giving her the exclusive right to use her discovery—but only for a limited 
time.  During the life of her patent, the inventor has the legal right to stop 
others from using her discovery.  This generally enables her to act as a 
monopolist, and thereby to extract enough rent from the market to cover 
her research and development expenses and make a profit.  To receive a 
patent, an inventor must submit a filing explaining both what her 
discovery does and how someone “skilled in the art” could replicate it.6
These filings are made available to the public, which promotes the 
dissemination of knowledge and enables others to avoid performing 
duplicative research.  After a limited time,7 the patent expires, and the 
discovery becomes freely available for use by the public.  
 
4 Or, to quote Thomas Jefferson once more on the nature of an idea: 
Its peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because 
every other possesses the whole of it.  He who receives an idea from 
me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who 
lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me. That ideas 
should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral 
and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, 
seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature, 
when she made them, like fire, expansible over all space, without 
lessening their density at any point, and like the air in which we 
breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of confinement 
or exclusive appropriation. 
Id. 
5 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (providing that Congress shall have the power to 
“secure[e], for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries,” in order to “promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts”).   
6 See generally 35 U.S.C.A. § 102(e) (2000).   
7 Generally twenty years from the date the patent is filed with the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office.  See, e.g., United States Patent Office, General Information 
Concerning Patents, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/ index.html.   
5By and large, patent is a good system, and it has served us well.8
Since the inception of the patent system, the United States has experienced 
robust technological growth, and it continues to do so to this day.  And, as 
research has advanced, technologies have become more closely knit, and 
the relationships between them—both complementary and competitive—
have become increasingly important.  Ironically, this development—
patent’s great success—has ultimately exposed one of its biggest failings.   
The problem stems from the patent system’s use of monopoly 
market power as the means through which inventors are rewarded.  While 
monopoly power is an effective mechanism for raising the inventor’s 
profits, it does so at the cost of increasing prices and reducing output.  
This artificial elevation of prices and reduction of output radically 
overincents the development of substitutes and discourages the 
development of complements.  Monopolies are usually criticized for their 
primary effects—that is, the creation of deadweight loss, in the form of 
unconsummated deals that would improve the welfare of both parties.  
This loss would not be presen t in a competitive market.9 However, for 
some technologies—those that are the most tightly connected to other 
technologies—the ramifications of their increased price and reduced 
output on the development and distribution of related technologies—that 
is, patent monopoly’s secondary effects—will be even more important.     
This paper presents and considers a modification to the patent 
system that helps address this defect of the current system:  the optional 
patent purchase.  Under the optional patent purchasing system, the 
government may offer to purchase a patent from its owner; these proceeds 
provide the supra-competitive profits the owner would otherwise earn 
 
8 Of course, this is not to say that patent systems, or ours in particular, are not without 
imperfections.  For example, the benefit a patent holder receives from her invention 
diverges from the benefit it confers on society, which can result in an inefficient level of 
research.  See, e.g., Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual 
Property Rights, 44 J.L. & Econ. 524, 530 (2001).  Applying for a patent can also be an 
uncertain proposition, and a rejected application may leave the inventor vulnerable 
because it provides a blueprint of how to replicate her discovery.  Patent applications are 
also expensive, often costing between $20,000 and $30,000, mostly in lawyers’ fees, and 
only seven percent of patent owners make enough profit to recoup the cost of their patent 
applications.  See Tom Harris, How Patents Work, Howstuffworks, at 
http://people.howstuffworks.com/patent6.htm; Michael Agger, Google Patent Overload,
Slate.com, Jan. 2, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2156386/fr/flyout.  Litigating a patent 
infringement claim is even more expensive, typically costing both parties around $1.2 
million apiece.  Richard Korman, Lo! Here Come the Technology Patents. Lo! Here 
Come the Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1998, at C4.  But these issues are not the focus 
of this paper.   
9 A competitive market is characterized by the presence of a large number of producers 
and consumers, each of which is perfectly informed about prices, and none of which has 
the market power to influence prices.  A competitive market results in a single price for a 
good, equal to its marginal cost of production, and results in no deadweight loss.   
6from monopoly sales under its patent.  If the owner agrees to sell,10 the 
government then makes the patent freely available to all parties.  Many 
firms then enter the market, driving production to its competitive market 
price and quantity and eliminating the deleterious effects that a patent 
monopoly would otherwise have on complementary and competitive 
technologies.    
The purpose of this paper is not to convince the reader that this 
alternative should be adopted; it is not an advocacy piece.  The purpose of 
the paper is expositive, to introduce the system and evaluate some of its 
implications, both positive and negative.  Its goal is both to explain the 
ways in which an optional patent purchase system might be beneficial for 
those patents whose secondary effects are most important and to explain 
why the pitfalls of such a system should give us pause about extending its 
use beyond this class of patents.  With this end in mind, a significant 
portion of this paper is devoted to presenting the current legal framework, 
and its corresponding economic implications, against which any proposed 
system must be gauged.  Part III discusses the patent system and its 
economic effects in greater detail before turning to an examination of 
subsidies, the traditional economic response to a monopolistic market, in 
Part IV.  Part V explains the optional patent purchasing program in detail, 
and discusses its virtues and failings relative to subsidy and unmodified 
patent.  The paper then concludes by briefly discussing one area where the 
optional patent purchase might be particularly beneficial:  pharmaceutical 
patents.  Also included for the interested reader is a mathematical 
appendix that complements the paper’s discussion with a more formal 
analysis.  But first, I attempt to place the optional patent purchase into 
context by briefly presenting some of the relevant academic literature.   
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Patent systems have existed for hundreds of years, and have long 
been considered a fait accompli by the entire industrialized world.11 
10 The voluntary nature of the sale ensures that the government will not be able to erode 
their incentives by offering less than what the company expects to earn from the patent in 
the marketplace.  
11 It is worth noting that this was not always the case.  In the late nineteenth century, 
particularly between 1850 and 1875, patent came under heavy fire from economists.  
Chief among their complaints were patent’s market-distorting effects and individual 
patent holders’ potential to hinder innovation, and they generally proposed reward 
systems, where the government offers monetary prizes to innovators instead of 
intellectual property rights, as an alternative.  In the United Kingdom, Robert Macfie, a 
member of Parliament, proposed replacing patent with a government-financed reward 
system, and the London Economist endorsed the concept.  Holland repealed its patent 
system in 1869.  See Shavell & Van Ypersele, supra note 8, at 526-27.  
7Patent’s chief competitor12 has been reward systems, in which the 
government incents technological progress by offering innovators 
monetary compensation, as opposed to intellectual property rights.13 The 
last few years have seen a sharp uptick in the amount of academic writing 
focused on the subject.  This phenomenon can be traced to a variety of 
factors; the recent congressional extension of copyright terms and its 
constitutional challenge in the court system have prompted an increased 
focus on alternate intellectual property regimes14 and, earlier, fears of 
terrorist-spread epidemics fueled discussion of the possibility and wisdom 
of the government acquiring patents on vaccines.15 
Whatever its roots, this increase in visibility has yielded a rich 
harvest of academic publications.  Perhaps the most substantial work of 
late is an October 2001 paper written by Steven Shavell and Tanguy Van 
Ypersele which presented and analyzed a formal, mathematical economic 
model of both the patent and reward systems.  They used their model, 
which incorporated both systems’ respective pre-development influences 
on research16 and their post-development market consequences, to assess 
and compare the expected social utility under each system.  Based on their 
model, Shavell and Van Ypersele concluded that an optional reward 
system, where inventors could choose between a pre-determined reward 
and a patent, was superior to a patent system, and that a mandatory reward 
system could be either better or worse than both the patent and optional 
 
12 Though it is generally only a competitor in theory, not in practice.   
13 These systems are also known as prize systems.  The two terms are used 
interchangeably through this paper. 
14 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 1505 (2003).   
15 Many of the articles are broad, policy-focused pieces which, mirroring the writings of 
the late 1800s, advocate reward systems as a superior alternative to patent.  Typical 
examples include a recent paper by Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, and 
Lee Davis’s Should We Consider Alternative Incentives for Basic Research? Patents vs. 
Prizes. Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003); 
Lee N. Davis, Should We Consider Alternative Incentives for Basic Research?  Patents 
vs. Prizes (June 8, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).  Others adopt a 
more skeptical approach, such as Patent Abolitionism, where Mark Janis argues for 
caution in the face of modern enthusiasm for dramatic patent system reforms by drawing 
on the history of the Victorian-era British patent abolitionism movement and 
emphasizing the similarities between the modern and Victorian reform movements.  
Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 899 (2002). Another 
example of skepticism over the value of switching to a reward system is an article by 
Keith E. Maskus entitled Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines: Some Economic 
Considerations, which expresses concern over the difficulties in administering a rewards 
system. Keith E. Maskus, Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines: Some Economic 
Considerations, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 563 (2002).  
16 The greater the payoff the system provides to the inventor, the great their incentive to 
engage in research and development.   
8reward systems, depending on how good the government’s information 
was relative to that of the inventor.17 
Although generally an interesting and well-written paper, Shavell 
and Ypersele’s model did not contemplate each system’s implications for 
the development and distribution of subsequent complementary and 
competitive technologies.18 This is entirely understandable; as the focus 
of their piece was on the inefficiencies of the patent system19 and the ways 
in which reward systems—in particular, an optional reward system 
overlaid onto patent—can remedy these problems.  This paper, in contrast, 
focuses on the patent system’s deleterious effects on future innovations 
and the ways in which an optional patent purchase system can ameliorate 
these shortcomings.20 
Perhaps the publication that is most similar to this piece is Michael 
Kremer’s Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation.21 
Kremer also starts with a critique of the patent system, but his first-choice 
 
17 It is worth noting that this result is dependent upon certain assumptions in their model 
about the government’s a priori knowledge of the value of innovations.  This paper does 
not make such strict assumptions about the government’s information.  See also John F. 
Duffy, The Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 37, 
42-44 (2004) (critiquing Shavell and Van Ypersele’s assumptions about government 
knowledge). 
18 The authors recognize as much.  See Shavell & Van Ypersele, supra note 8, at 543 
(“We did not discuss the issue of subsequent innovations, that is, improvements to 
innovations or new innovations depending on past ones.”). 
19 Specifically, the authors focused on how patent’s failure to provide an inventor with 
the full social value of her invention can result in some socially beneficial inventions not 
being developed and the effects of the monopoly created by patent on the distribution of 
the technology after its development.  See id. at 530. 
20 It is also briefly worth highlighting the differences and similarities between the 
optional patent purchase system presented here and the optional reward system discussed 
in Shavell and Van Ypersele’s paper.  In Shavell and Van Ypersele’s model, the optional 
reward was conceived as an alternative inducement for development of the initial 
innovation, a substitute for a patent right.  It aims to fix both patent’s shortcomings in 
inducing research and its negative effects on the distribution of an innovation after its 
development.  Its scope is therefore broader, and its goals more ambitious, than the 
optional patent purchase system, which is designed only to address the post-development 
effects of patent.  However, the optional patent purchase system’s reduced scope also 
improves its feasibility:  Instituting such an optional reward system requires the 
government to determine the value of the innovation far in advance of its actual 
development, and to commit itself to paying such a reward long in advance.  An optional 
patent purchase system, by contrast, only requires the government to determine the value 
of an innovation after it has been patented.  Further, Shavell and Van Ypersele’s optional 
reward system ties government prizes to a technology’s social value, whereas the 
optional patent purchase system enables the government to determine its offering price 
based solely on the patent’s private value—a metric that is far easier to calculate.  See 
discussion in Part V.C.1, infra.
21 Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q.J. 
Econ. 1137 (1998).   
9alternative is not a prize system per se, but “direct government support of 
research,” which he defines somewhat more broadly.  He then shifts his 
attention to patent buyouts, which he advocates as a potentially superior 
mechanism for fostering innovation than patent alone.  The focus of his 
paper is a mechanism for effecting such buyouts; Kremer espouses 
second-price auctions with closed bids and a mark-up.22 
Both Kremer’s piece and this paper spend significant time 
discussing both the potential benefits of a government patent-purchasing 
system and the pitfalls of its implementation.  However, Kremer focuses 
his attention on the problem of how the government prices the patent.  
This paper, on the other hand, focuses on the effects of an optional patent 
purchase system on the development and distribution of related 
technologies.  In doing so, it also takes a somewhat broader and more 
objective (as opposed to persuasive) approach.    
Before proceeding, it is also worth noting that many papers in this 
field adopt economic models that do not account for distributional affects.  
For example, Shavell and Van Ypersele reach all of their conclusions 
based on a social welfare function which considers only the value that 
individuals obtain from the innovation and the cost of its production and 
development.  It does not monitor whether utility accrues to consumers or 
producers; its only concern is whether an innovation is developed and how 
much deadweight loss is created by the method through which it is 
distributed.   
For economists, such a focus on overall social utility, as opposed 
to monitoring the utility of separate groups, is common and perfectly 
natural.23 This practice is commonly justified in one of two ways:24 the 
first is to assume that the government has an administratively costless 
lump sum tax option available to it, so that distributional issues can be 
handled later at no cost, making the size of the economic pie a social 
planner’s only concern.  The second is to assume that if in all scenarios the 
economic pie is maximized, each individual will lose in some places and 
gain in others, but that on average everyone’s utility will be increased; a 
rising tide lifts all boats.25 
22 The auction structure is designed to enable the government to take advantage of 
private-sector information advantages, and the mark-up reflects an attempt to compensate 
for patent only rewarding the private (as opposed to the social) value of an innovation.   
23 See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002) 
(arguing that policymakers should concern themselves with total welfare and not with 
issues of fairness).  
24 There is also a third justification, a sort of “we are they” view.  Under this view, 
corporations are often assumed to be public and widely owned by many investors 
representing broad segments of society, etc., so that the distributional issues become 
largely illusory or at least divorced from the issue under consideration.  Differential   
25 The first assumption is almost certainly untenable in reality; the second is debatable, as 
it hinges on the assumption that no groups are systematic winners or losers.   
10
Yet, at the same time, it seems strange and unintuitive to 
completely ignore these distributional effects.  Further, doing so can lead 
to somewhat perverse results; for example, a social planner who cares only 
about total social utility will find a perfect monopoly, where the 
monopolist reaps all the gains from the sale of her product, to be equally 
desirable as the competitive market outcome, and preferable to all others.  
Were it administratively feasible, such a planner would advocate in favor 
of a prize system where the prize for every invention were exactly equal to 
the net benefits to society of its development; one of their primary 
complaints with patent is that it generally offers private development 
incentives that are below the social value of the invention.26 They take 
this stance because it would create socially efficient research and market 
allocation incentives.  However, it would also have a somewhat unsettling 
result:  Anyone without a financial stake in the invention would be 
completely indifferent to its development.   
On a more pragmatic note, many economics papers put forth 
recommendations for policy decisions that require legislative structural 
changes to the current systemic framework.  In our democratic society, 
such legislation is not likely to succeed without broad popular support, 
which is both intricately and inextricably tied to distributional effects.  For 
example, Shavell and Ypersele correctly note that, under their model, 
industry should not object to an optional reward system, as it can only 
raise their profits,27 but they fail to address consumers, who might or 
might not support such a measure.28 In an attempt to address these 
perceived shortcomings, this paper will focus primarily on developing a 
system which improves the welfare of all parties.    
Having placed this paper into context among the previously 
existing body of academic literature, I now proceed to provide some 
context for the optional patent purchase system by discussing the existing 
patent system and its economic implications.    
 
III. THE U.S. PATENT SYSTEM 
A.  Overview and Direct Effects 
 
26 This need not always be the case.  For an example of patent providing private 
incentives that are greater than social incentives, see Part III.B, infra.
27 Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 8, at 544. 
28 Shavell and Ypersele’s model has other defects, most of which they themselves note in 
their paper: they do not consider the tax financing costs; the effects on the “race to be 
first,” where private incentives favoring early discovery exceed the social benefits, 
leading to research expenditures above the optimal level, etc.  See generally Shavell & 
Ypersele, supra note 8, at 541-545.   
11
The U.S. Patent System was conceived with the purpose of 
“promoting science and the useful arts.”29 Even in the days of the 
founders, research and development was costly.  Inventors would seek to 
recoup these preliminary costs through the sales of their subsequent 
innovation.  However, once an inventor had successfully developed her 
technology, others could copy it and enter the market with the same 
technology.  This eroded the profits of the original investor, diminishing 
her motivations to research, and incented her to closely guard her findings.  
This was inefficient, as it meant slower technological progress for society 
and an increase in costly duplicative work.   
The patent system addresses these problems by granting inventors 
temporary monopolies.  During the life of the patent, they are insulated 
from competition, giving them supra-competitive profits and protecting 
their incentives to do research.  The temporary nature of the patent also 
guarantees that the invention will eventually fall into the public domain 
and become accessible at the socially efficient competitive market rate.  In 
addition, to be eligible for patent protection, an inventor must submit a 
filing which explains her invention and how to replicate it.  This spreads 
knowledge and prevents costly duplicative efforts.   
 An example is helpful to illustrate these concepts:  Consider the 
pharmaceutical industry.  Finding, developing, and shepherding a new 
drug through the regulatory approval process is an uncertain,30 
phenomenally expensive31 process which can take over a decade.32 On the 
other hand, once a drug has been developed and approved, it can typically 
be produced at a very low marginal cost.33 There are numerous large 
 
29 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, 288 (James Madison) “The 
utility of this power will scarcely be questioned.”); id. (stating that “[t]he public good 
fully coincides” with granting patent monopoly rights to inventors).   
30 Only one in five thousand experimental drugs makes it to market.  See, e.g.,
MedicineNet.com, Drug Approvals - From Invention to Market . . . A 12- Year Trip, at 
http://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=9877 [hereinafter “Drug 
Approvals”].    
31 It typically costs hundreds of millions of dollars to bring a new drug through the 
process to the point at which it can be sold.  Some estimates put the figure as high as 
$900 million per drug.  See, e.g., FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS, 1999 ANNUAL 
REPORT (1999), available at http://www.dallasfed.org/fed/annual/1999p/ar99.html 
(estimating the cost at $350 million); Matthew Herper, The Half-Full Economy: Big 
Pharma’s Research Drought Ends, Forbes.com, at 
http://forbes.com/2003/05/28/cx_mh_0528pharma.html (estimating the cost at $900 
million).  This outlay is merely to get the drug to the point at which it can be sold; it does 
not include production costs or sales and marketing expenses, nor does it guarantee that 
anyone will actually buy the drug.   
32 The average time to market for a new drug is twelve years.  See, e.g., Drug Approvals, 
supra note 30.   
33 Pundits have quipped that the first pill costs $500,000,000 to produce, the second pill 
costs a penny.  See, e.g., FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS, supra note 31; Sam Kazman, 
Demonize, Then Pulverize, NAVIGATOR, Nov. 4, 2004, available at 
12
pharmaceutical companies with the ability to cheaply reverse-engineer the 
drug; this would cause competitive production and resultant low profits for 
the innovating company.  Because of the staggering cost of research and it 
uncertain nature, this low payoff would thin the river of drug discovery to 
a paltry trickle.   
Patents prevent other companies from producing and selling the 
drug, guaranteeing the inventing pharmaceutical company a monopoly for 
a limited time.  This enables them to retain enough of the fruits of their 
labor to earn sufficient profits to make research and development in their 
interest.  The pharmaceutical industry is heavily reliant on patent 
protection.34 
Yet patent protection does not come without costs.  Monopoly 
power means decreased output and higher prices,35 which means fewer 
people, particularly the poor, have access to the new invention.  Worse, it 
creates a scenario where many people are unable to purchase the 
invention, even though they are willing to pay more than it would cost the 
patent holder to produce it.  These unconsummated transactions constitute 
a significant deadweight loss for society, and represent pure social waste.  
This can be seen graphically in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, below.   
 
http://www.objectivistcenter.org/showcontent.aspx?ct=986&h=53; Rafe Needleman, Why 
Americans Pay More for Software, ZDNet.com, at 
http://review.zdnet.com/AnchorDesk/4520-7297_16-5132742.html. 
34 See, e.g., Carlos María Correa, WORLD HEALTH ORG., Ownership of Knowledge – the 
Role of Patents in Pharmaceutical R&D, 82 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG., Oct. 2004, 
available at http://www.scielosp.org/scielo.php?pid=S0042-
96862004001000015&script=sci_arttext&tlng=en.  
35 This is because a monopolist controls the price and the output for her market, subject 
only to the restrictions of the demand curve.  Assuming she can not discriminate among 
consumers, if she lowers her price, she will gain some sales, raising her profits.  
However, she also loses profit on all of the sales she would have gotten at the higher 
price because she will be charging a lower price in those transactions as well.  This 
problem does not arise in a competitive market, because, by definition, in a competitive 
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B.  Secondary Effects 
 
The problems discussed so far can fairly be considered direct 
effects of a patent; they are the pricing and production quantity responses 
that the firm makes after receiving patent protection.  However, the 
economic landscape is increasingly complex and interrelated, and there are 
many secondary effects of patent protection which have accordingly 
become, and continue to become, more important over time.   
One such secondary effect is that other firms face strong incentives 
to develop similar technologies—in economic parlance, substitutes—that 
they would not have otherwise.  Under the patent system, a rival 
company’s incentives to develop a new technology are twofold:  The 
company reaps the reward both for the improvement that the new product 
represents relative to existing ones and the reward that they receive from 
converting a monopolistic market into a duopolistic one.36 In many cases, 
 
36 It is worth noting that converting a monopolistic market into a duopolistic market 
intrinsically carries with it social benefits in the form of reduced deadweight loss.  Under 
fairly typical symplifying assumptions—linear, downward-sloping demand curve, and 
positive, constant cost of production—the deadweight loss created by a monopoly is 2.25 
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the profits a company reaps from entering a duopoly will dwarf the profits 
stemming from the product’s improvement relative to previously existing 
alternatives.   
The pharmaceutical industry again provides an excellent 
illustration.  The current system causes companies to spend hundreds of 
millions of dollars to develop so-called “me-too” drugs which have 
medicinal properties that are similar or identical to other products which 
have already proven to be commercially successful.37 Nearly three-
quarters of the “blockbuster” drugs38 approved by the FDA between 1992 
and 2001 were “me-too” drugs, such as allergy medications.39 Although 
the new technology that these drugs offer provides comparatively little 
marginal value to society as a whole,40 companies still face significant 
 
times as big as that created by a duopoly.  Compare EQUATION A5, infra, with EQUATION 
D5, infra. Even so, under the same assumptions, the private incentives to develop a 
competing product are 1.6 times the social welfare that is created by shifting from a 
monopoly to a duopoly.  Compare EQUATION D3, infra, with EQUATIONS A5 and D5, 
infra. Moreover, the wisdom of so closely linking research incentives to ameliorating 
artificially created market failures is not at all clear.   
37 See, e.g., NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. RESEARCH & EDUC. FOUND., 
CHANGING PATTERNS OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 1-14 (2002), available at 
www.nihcm.org/finalweb/innovations.pdf; Correa, supra note 34 (“According to a report 
of the National Institute for Health Care Management . . . in the United States, from 1989 
to 2000 the [FDA] approved 1035 new drug applications.  Of these, [35%] were products 
with new active ingredients, or new molecular entities (NMEs).  The other 65% used 
active ingredients that were already available in a marketed product.  Over half (54%) 
were incrementally modified drugs, or new versions of medicines whose active 
ingredients were already available in an approved product.  The rest (11%) contained the 
same active ingredient as identical marketed products.”); Merrill Goozner, The Price 
Isn’t Right, AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 11, 2000, available at 
http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint &articleId=5420 
(“FDA statistics for the 1990s suggest that about half of industry research is aimed at 
developing me-too drugs.”).  Some of the more famous examples of recent years are the 
drugs Levitra and Cialis, developed in the wake of the tremendous commercial success of 
Viagra.   
38 A blockbuster drug is one with annual sales of $1 billion or more.  See, e.g.,
Knowledge@Wharton, Without the Next Blockbuster Drug, Merck Faces a Murky 
Future, Dec. 2003, at knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=886; Peter 
Lansbury, An Innovative Drug Industry?  Well, No, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2003, at B2. 
39 Lansbury, supra note 38; see also Catherine Arnst, Amy Barrett, Michael Arndt & 
John Carey, The Waning of the Blockbuster Drug, BUS. WK., Oct. 18, 2004, available at 
(“[Fifty percent] of blockbusters are heavily marketed me-too drugs, offering little benefit 
over others in their class . . . .”). 
40 Lansbury, supra note 38 (noting that between 1982 and 1991, the FDA classified 53% 
of all newly approved drugs as offering “little or no therapeutic gain”); Goozner, supra 
note 37 (“In 1997 SmithKline Beecham won FDA approval for carvedilol (Coreg), a beta 
blocker for congestive heart failure.  SmithKline launched the drug with much fanfare 
and won a significant share of the crowded market.  However, a study completed last 
year showed it was no more effective than metoprolol, a generic beta blocker on the 
market since 1978.”).  However, these drugs do provide social value in that oligopolies 
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private incentives to develop them because the market structure created by 
patent still endows them with duopoly profits.41 From a social welfare 
perspective, these development monies could be far better spent 
elsewhere.  
Just as the patent system greatly overincents the development of 
substitutes, so too does it underincent the development of complementary 
products and technologies—i.e., products which are only useful, or at least 
much more useful, when combined with certain other products.  If the 
inventors of two complementary products each holds an effective 
monopoly on its production (which is what the patent system attempts to 
convey), each will reduce its output and raise its price.  However, each 
monopolist’s price increase affects the other’s sales; when consumers 
purchase both goods together, a price increase in one good means a price 
increase in the bundle.  This reduces consumers’ consumption of both 
goods.   
At the same time, when each monopolist sets her price, she will be 
concerned only with her own profits; she will therefore raise her price 
until it is no longer profitable for her to do so.  She will not take into 
account the lost profits forfeited by the complementary monopolist as a 
result of the decreased volume of sales.  This will cause both monopolists 
to raise their prices to levels far in excess of the socially efficient level.  
This problem, whereby each monopolist separately “marks up” her price 
to maximize her own profit, is generally called the “double markup” or 
“double marginalization” problem.42 The price levels created by the dual 
marginalization problem are not only higher than the socially efficient 
level; they are actually too high from the perspective of maximizing the 
monopolists’ joint profits.43 In such a case, if both monopolists can agree 
to decrease their prices and increase their output, the result is a Pareto 
improvement.44 
produce significantly less deadweight loss than monopolies do; relative to monopolies, 
oligopolies also redistribute surplus from producers to consumers.  Cf. Christopher 
Rowland, ‘Me-Too’ Prescription Drugs Win Support in Tufts Study, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 10, 2004, available at http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2004/11/10/ 
me_too_prescription_drugs_win_support_in_tufts_study/ (“[F]ollow-on drugs introduce 
market competition, which holds down prices . . . .”).  On balance, it is not at all clear that 
inducing duplicative scientific research is the optimal way to combat what is essentially 
an artificially created economic problem.    
41 Or, more generally, oligopoly. 
42 For an excellent and more formal presentation of this problem, see HAL R. VARIAN,
INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 453-55 (4th ed. 1996).  Varian 
approaches the problem in the context of one monopolist in a factor market and another 
in a downstream market, but this case is functionally identical to the complements 
problem presented here by the patent system.   
43 Id. at 455. 
44 At any price above and quantity below the monopoly level, any decrease in price and 
increase in output increases consumer surplus.  It therefore follows that joint 
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Patents can also impede the development of complements in a 
more drastic way:  Because patents convey a property interest, further 
improvements that incorporate the patented technology can only be 
produced and sold with the consent of the patent holder.  By refusing to 
give her consent, the patent holder can effectively prevent others from 
developing complements to her invention altogether.   
In general, the patent holder will often have incentives to reach an 
agreement with would-be complement-developers to alleviate this 
problem.45 However, such an agreement entails transaction costs and 
reduces the incentives of subsequent developers to make further 
improvements,46 as the secondary innovator will frequently need to 
relinquish some of her profits to the original innovator47 in order to secure 
her consent.48 
Similarly, the property aspects of patent can also give the patent 
holder a great deal of control over the directions in which the new 
technology may be developed and the problems to which it may be 
applied.  This can be a significant problem.  Suppose that a technology 
was developed for a use in a particular industry, but that it would be far 
 
coordination, whereby each monopolist decreases her price and increases her output, will 
raise consumer surplus as well.   
45 I.e., she stands to make a royalty or obtain a flat fee in exchange for giving her 
permission to use the patent.   
46 These two factors interact in a very interesting way.  If the research is somewhat 
speculative and requires a significant commitment of resources beforehand which cannot 
be used for another purpose, then if the subsequent innovator successfully develops an 
improvement, she finds herself entirely at the mercy of the original patent holder, who is 
in a position to extract most or all of the value of the new innovation from the new 
innovator.  The other possibility is for the would-be improver to negotiate the rights from 
the initial innovator before commiting resources and beginning research.  However, there 
is greater uncertainty, which increases transaction costs because neither side knows 
exactly what is being bargained over.  Moreover, the research may be unsuccessful, in 
which case all the resources which went into negotiating the transaction are wasted as 
well.    
47 The development of a complement, almost by definition, increases the value of the 
original invention.  However, the holder of the original invention has an advantage 
because she alone can provide access to the original, essential invention.  If there are 
multiple inventors capable of developing the same complementary technology, but none 
of them is willing to do so without the prior consent of the original inventor to use her 
technology (as is likely to happen if developing the new technology entails significant 
costs), then the original patent holder can essentially pit these would-be inventors against 
each other.  By auctioning off the right to use her patent only to the highest bidder, she 
can capture nearly all of the benefits of the complementary improvement, greatly 
reducing the second inventor’s incentives in the process.   
48 It should also be noted that, while patent rents to the original innovator do decrease the 
incentives of subsequent innovators, to the extent that they are anticipated by the original 
innovator, they incent the development of the initial technology.  
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more useful in a competing industry.49 In such a case, the developer may 
be able to deny her would-be rivals all use of the technology, and any 
subsequent innovations resulting therefrom.  This could drastically reduce 
social welfare.   
Admittedly, a patent that confers sufficient market power to 
completely prevent the development of complementary products 
altogether is likely an extreme case.  On the other hand, we would expect 
the double markup problem to be comparatively common, and both effects 
reduce innovators’ incentives to develop substitutes.   
Of course, if bargaining is sufficiently easy, we need not worry 
about either the direct patent blocking problem or double marginalization 
problem.  If all parties are rational and informed and there are no 
transaction costs, the Coase Theorem predicts that the parties will reach a 
mutually efficient result.  Applying this to the most severe incarnation of 
the patent blocking problem is instructive:  If a rival stands to gain more 
from using the technology than the patent holder would lose, the two 
parties will reach an agreement whereby the rival gains access to the 
technology.  In exchange for this privilege, the rival will pay the original 
patent holder.50 In a similar fashion, the two firms can defeat the double 
marginalization problem by agreeing to jointly lower their prices.   
Unfortunately, reality seldom presents the idealized conditions that 
the Coase Theorem requires; thus, in practice, there is no guarantee that 
the parties will reach such an agreement.51 Without such an agreement, 
 
49 This is not as far-fetched of an idea as it may sound.  Many competing industries use 
similar technologies, and often in today’s complex technological society an innovation 
developed in one arena ends up having far-reaching implications for other applications 
that were never conceived of when the initial technology was being developed.  For 
example, consider the branch of mathematics known as number theory.  Many of its 
pioneers found it particularly enjoyable because it was purely abstract, and had no 
potential applications; thus, it could never be used to inflict harm on anyone.  See, e.g.,
G.H. HARDY, A MATHEMATICIAN’S APOLOGY (1940) (“I [begin] by laying stress on the 
harmlessness of mathematics—‘the study of mathematics is . . . a perfectly harmless and 
innocent occupation.’”); id. (“I have never done anything ‘useful.’  No discovery of mine 
has made, or is likely to make, directly or indirectly, for good or ill, the least difference to 
the amenity of the world.”).  Number theory has since proven broadly applicable; all 
modern militaries now communicate using codes that are based on number theory.   
50 Note that for such a deal to happen, the rival must pay the original patentholder more 
than it loses in profits from its rival having access to its patented technology.  The rival 
should be willing to pay this much because, by assumption, she gains more from having 
access to the technology than the original owner loses from her having access.  The gains 
from the technology are not merely zero-sum.   
51 This phenomenon may be heightened, as a practical matter if not a theoretical one, in 
the case of network goods.  In these cases, where the technology’s value increases as 
more users adopt it, an innovator’s initial success acts as a bar to entry against future 
competitors.  These situations are susceptible to common adoption of a single standard, 
and initial successes may be dispositive (consider VHS and Betamax).  In theory, a rival 
who stands to gain more will still be able to strike a deal by borrowing against its future 
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the patent holder can prevent anyone from using or improving upon her 
patent.  History provides numerous illustrations of this phenomenon,52 but 
perhaps the most commonly cited is the case of James Watt, father of the 
steam engine.  To protect his business, Watt refused to license others to 
use or make improvements on his patent.53 Watt himself was generally 
opposed to the use of steam power for transportation and, due to safety 
concerns, to the utilization of high-pressure steam in particular.54 Watt’s 
 
profits as the dominant technology.  In practice, however, it’s hard to imagine a fledgling 
technology in a contested industry borrowing heavily against its future speculative 
success. 
52 For example, Thomas Edison and the Wright brothers refused to license their 
respective patents for incandescent lighting and an aircraft stabilization and steering 
system.  Their behavior temporarily impeded the development of improvements.  See, 
e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, CUMULATIVE AND OVERLAPPING INNOVATIONS 
(2004), excerpt available at hbswk.hbs.edu/item/4548.html; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL 
OF THE NAT’L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 26 (Stephen A. 
Merrill, Richard C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004), available at 
http://newton.nap.edu/books/0309089107/html.  It is worth noting that the Wright 
brothers’ patent blocking was solved by government intervention; the advent of World 
War I spurred the U.S. government to convince a number of aircraft designers, including 
the Wright brothers, to pool their patents.  See JAFFE & LERNER, supra. Nor are such 
practices restricted to such landmark patents.  The Romanoff Caviar Company patented 
synthetic caviar in the United States in order to prevent the introduction of synthetic 
caviar, which could have been produced more cheaply than natural caviar, into the U.S. 
market.  See, e.g., Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a 
Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389, 392-93 (2002).   
53 See, e.g., Shavell & Van Ypersele, supra note 8, at 543.  It is left to the reader to 
speculate as to precisely why the Coase Theorem failed in this instance.  It is interesting 
to note that Watt refused to license his patent even when his business, Boulton and Watt 
Co., was turning down new orders because it did not have enough skilled workers to fill 
them.  Moreover, even after his patent expired and many competitors entered the market, 
Watt’s engines were of generally higher quality, and accordingly he maintained his high 
sales price for many years afterwards, and even had an increase in orders.  See, e.g., JOHN 
H. LIENHARD, THE ENGINES OF OUR INGENUITY 94-95 (2003), available at 
www.uh.edu/engines/; Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against 
Intellectual Monopoly, 2003 Lawrence R. Klein Lecture, 45 INT’L ECON. REV. 327 
(2004); F.M. Scherer, Invention and Innovation in the Watt-Boulton Steam-Engine 
Venture, 6 TECH. & CULTURE 165 (1965); Vishwas Devaiah, A History of Patent Law, 
Alternative Law Forum, http://www.altlawforum.org/PUBLICATIONS/document.2004-
12-18.0853561257; The Steam Engine in the Factory, fathom.com, 
http://www.fathom.com/course/21701780/session2.html.  But see George Selgin & John 
Turner, James Watt As Intellectual Monopolist: Comment on Boldrin and Levine, 47 
INT’L ECON. REV. 1341 (2006) (critiquing Boldrin and Levine). 
54 High pressure steam required an engine’s boiler to withstand significant pressure.  If 
something went wrong, the boiler could explode, spewing scalding hot metal and steam.  
See, e.g., LEINHARD, supra note 53, at 93-94; Nancy G. Levenson, High-Pressure Steam 
Engines and Computer Software, presented at the International Conference on Software 
Engineering, Melbourne, Australia, May 1992, available at 
sunnyday.mit.edu/papers/steam.ps. 
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conduct delayed the invention of the high-pressure steam engine—and 
with it, the locomotive—until after his patent expired in 1800.55 
Even among the limited uses Watt made of his invention, his 
patent had a staggering effect on its adoption.  Before Watt began 
production, there were approximately 130 steam engines in Britain, mostly 
following the design which Watt had improved upon, that of Thomas 
Newcomen.56 When Watt’s patent protection expired twenty-four years 
later, the number of steam engines in Britain had increased to 
approximately one thousand.57 However, less than a third of those 
followed Watt’s design, the rest still followed the inefficient old 
Newcomen design.58 The total power output of all the steam engines in 
Britain at that time was perhaps 10,000 horsepower.59 Over the next 
fifteen years, the steam engines installed in England alone had over twenty 
times this many horsepower.60 
Thus, while the property right aspects of patent ownership do not 
appear particularly troubling in theory, the case of the steam engine 
provides an excellent demonstration of why these features may be quite 
problematic in practice.  Although it is rare61 that a single patent will have 
such a transformative effect on society,62 there are a multitude of others 
that mark smaller, more incremental steps forward that, when considered 
together, have deep and far-reaching effects.63 These concerns strongly 
 
55 Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 8, at 543.  While James Watt did receive a patent for a 
steam locomotive in 1784 based on the work of his employee William Murdoch, the first 
steam locomotive to run on rails was built in 1804, after the patent had expired, by 
Richard Trevithick.  See, e.g., LIENHARD, supra note 54, at 95.  Nor was this the only 
innovation delayed by Watt.  James Pickard had developed and patented a crank and 
flywheel arrangement to convert the vertical motion of the steam engine piston into the 
rotary motion of a crankshaft to power machinery.  Since neither he nor Watt would 
allow the other to use their patents, Watt had to resort to a less-efficient “sun and planet” 
gearing system instead.  Boldrin & David K. Levine, supra note 53; Devaiah, supra note 
53; The Steam Engine in the Factory, supra note 53. 





61 Even though it is rare in the sense that the vast majority of patents do not have nearly 
so large an impact, a few moments of thought is sufficient to produce many pioneers 
whose inventions marked dramatic steps forward:  Guttenberg’s printing press, Marconi’s 
radio, Fleiming’s discovery of penicillin; Edison’s light bulb, Bell’s telephone, and the 
Wright brothers’ plane provide easy examples.    
62 Of course, it is easy to see how this example could be adapted to a case of multiple 
patents that were vested in a single entity.  The key issue is ownership of a technological 
pathway, not the number of patents required to secure that pathway.   
63 It is unclear whether the holders of multiple patents that are only valuable together 
would be more or less likely to reach an agreement than the owner of a particularly 
valuable major patent and a more minor improvement to that patent.  There are 
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caution against merely dismissing the patent complements problem as 
unlikely to arise, or easily cured by the actions of the marketplace.   
Indeed, the pharmaceutical industry provides a stark example of a 
more recent instance where the owners of two complementary patents 
failed to reach an agreement.  Erythropoietin (“EPO”) is used to stimulate 
the development of red blood cells, which is particularly useful to those 
suffering from anemia, including those suffering from chronic renal 
failure, chemotherapy patients, and premature infants.64 Through various 
patents, Amgen has an effective monopoly on the manufacture of EPO.65 
Treatment is expensive because each patient requires very high levels of 
EPO.66 In 1997, another laboratory was issued a patent for a compound 
that would enable patients to be treated using a much smaller dose of EPO 
and, accordingly, at a small fraction of the cost.67 Amgen did not license 
the new patent, and the newly patented compound went unused.68 
It is impossible to say whether the substitutes problem or the 
complements problem is more vexing.  On one level, the complements 
problem is less troubling because it is more amenable to being solved 
privately.  A merger of the two monopolists, or effective joint 
coordination on pricing, reduces it to the more mild case of monopoly 
pricing.69 Since both monopolists stand to benefit from such a transition, 
there are some grounds for believing that firms can deal with this problem 
entirely through private contract.   
On the other hand, there is no guarantee that the monopolists will 
reach such an agreement.  Transaction costs, regulatory prohibitions, 
strategic behavior, and commitment problems are only a few of the many 
potential obstacles that can prevent this from happening.  Left unchecked, 
the double marginalization problem is all the more frustrating because it is 
a market distortion that literally adheres to the benefit of no one—both 
consumers and producers are significantly injured as a result.   
 
arguments supporting both views.  In practice, the difference will likely depend on 
various situation-specific factors.   
64 See, e.g., Saunders, supra note 52, at 395.   
65 Id. 
66 This is because these patients lack a particular chemical that prevents from being 
immediately excreted in urine.  Id. 
67 The compound enabled a patient to retain EPO instead of excreting it immediately.  Id. 
A patient who received the newly patented compound needed only between 2% and 10% 
of the dose of EPO that she would need otherwise.  Id. 
68 Id. Purportedly, this was because Amgen calculated that it was not in its financial 
interest to do so, as the reduced amount of EPO administered to each patient would not 
be outweighed by the additional patients who would then use EPO.  Id. If this was, in 
fact, Amgen’s motivation and its calculations were correct, Amgen still would not have 
licensed the patent even under the idealized conditions of the Coase Theorem. 
69 Which, of course, is still socially inefficient; see discussion supra.
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C.  The Uncertainty Costs of Patent 
 
Enforcing patent rights also creates significant administrative 
costs.  To deter competition to the greatest possible extent, firms patent as 
much as they can and patent applications are written to cover the broadest 
class of activity.  However, patent law creates limits on what may be 
patented, both in the abstract and in specific instances.70 This can lead to a 
great deal of uncertainty over exactly what behavior is covered by which 
patents, and whether or not those patents are valid.71 In the shadow of this 
uncertainty, patent holders seek to expand the scope of their patent as 
much as possible in order to insulate their business from competition to 
the greatest extent.  Meanwhile, these same market forces inexorably drive 
competitors to engage in behavior that is as close to the boundaries of 
protection as possible without actually crossing them.   
This situation is significantly exacerbated by the market distortions 
patent creates, for the same reasons that the patent system encourages the 
development of substitutes:  A company that successfully develops a 
comparable technology just beyond the scope of a rival’s patent protection 
reaps more than the value the new product represents relative to existing 
 
70 In the words of the United States Patent Office: 
In the language of the statute, any person who “invents or 
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, 
may obtain a patent,” subject to the conditions and requirements of the 
law. . . . 
. . . .
The patent law specifies that the subject matter must be 
“useful.” The term “useful” in this connection refers to the condition 
that the subject matter has a useful purpose and also includes 
operativeness, that is, a machine which will not operate to perform the 
intended purpose would not be called useful, and therefore would not 
be granted a patent. 
Interpretations of the statute by the courts have defined the 
limits of the field of subject matter which can be patented, thus it has 
been held that the laws of nature, physical phenomena and abstract 
ideas are not patentable subject matter. 
A patent cannot be obtained upon a mere idea or suggestion. 
The patent is granted upon the new machine, manufacture, etc., as has 
been said, and not upon the idea or suggestion of the new machine. A 
complete description of the actual machine or other subject matter for 
which a patent is sought is required.  
U.S. Patent Office, What Can Be Patented, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/ 
general/what.htm, excerpted from U.S. PATENT OFFICE, GENERAL INFORMATION 
CONCERNING PATENTS.
71 Some companies aggressively search for and attack patents that they believe are legally 
invalid.  For example, Barr pharmaceuticals, a generic drug manufacturer, incorporates 
the search for breakable patents as an important and permanent part of its business model.  
Korman, supra note 8, at C4.   
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ones, it also reaps a reward for converting a monopolistic market into a 
duopolistic one.  In many cases, the profits a company reaps from entering 
a duopoly will dominate.  Just as patent overincents substitutes, so too 
does it overincent conflicting interpretations of claims.   
The end result is a great deal of patent litigation.  Patent litigation 
has long been an expensive proposition, and it has only gotten more 
expensive over time.72 The median cost to each party in a patent trial is 
$1.2 million; complex trials can run over $6 million.73 Patent disputes 
 
72 As Lord Esher wrote in 1894: 
[T]he moment there is a patent case one can see it before the case is 
opened, or called in the list.  How can we see it?  We can see it by a 
pile of books as high as this [making visual reference] invariably, one 
set for each Counsel, one set for each Judge, of course, and by the 
voluminous shorthand notes:  we know “Here is a patent case.”   
Now, what is the result of all this?  Why that a man had better 
have his patent infringed, or have anything happen to him in this world, 
short of losing all his family by influenza, than have a dispute about a 
patent.  His patent is swallowed up, and he is ruined.  Whose fault is it?  
It is really not the fault of the law; it is the fault of the mode of 
conducting the law in a patent case.  This is what causes all this 
mischief. 
Ungar v. Sugg, 9 R.P.C. 113, 116 (1892) (Opinion of Lord Esher, J.).   
73 Korman, supra note 8, at C4.  To provide another example, each time that Barr 
Pharmaceuticals goes to trial to fight what it considers to be a vulnerable patent, it 
expects to spend between six and eight million dollars.  In one case, which Barr 
ultimately lost, District Judge Malcolm Howard wrote that: 
In the twenty-five months [] between the filing of the initial 
complaint…and the commencement of the trial…approximately five 
hundred forty-one pleadings have been filed and dozens of hearings on 
motions and discovery matters have been conducted... The court has 
entered eighty-eight written orders and numerous bench rulings… 
To state that the case has been hotly contested would be an 
understatement.  The parties have amassed learned, experienced and 
sizable trial teams who have represented their clients zealously and 
competently.   
The administrative complexity [of] conducting a trial of this 
magnitude has been enormous for the court and the parties.  The sixty-
year-old courtroom…has been converted into a contemporary high tech 
facility utilizing real time court reporting and six computer-integrated 
video display monitors.  It is highly conceivable that the cost of this 
trial for the parties exceeds $100,000 per day, in addition to the time 
and expense associated with this court and the jury.  As the case enters 
its fourth week of trial, the parties estimate, somewhat conservatively 
the court suspects, that the trial will last an additional six to eight 
weeks. 
Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab., 828 F. Supp. 1208, 1209 (E.D.N.C. 1993).  Nor is 
this problem confined solely to our own patent system.  See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. 
Generics (UK) Ltd., 2003 EWHC 2842 (Pat) (quoting Ungar, 9 R.P.C. at 116 (Opinion of 
Lord Esher, J.)) (noting that by the third day of trial, the two parties had spent over 
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may be resolved without lawsuits being filed, but this happens less and 
less frequently, and the more valuable the patent being fought over, the 
more likely that a case will go to trial.74 
The uncertainty surrounding patents has other negative effects.  
Researchers’ concerns over the costs of defending against a patent 
infringement suit and potential liability if they are found to be violating a 
patent can deter them from carrying out research in certain fields and 
channel them into others.  This encourages the exploration of second-
choice research topics—those which the researcher expects to be less 
promising, those which the researcher is less adept at investigating, or 
those which the researcher is less motivated to pursue.  This problem is 
real.  For example, there is empirical evidence that biotech companies 
with fewer resources, notably new start-ups, are avoiding those fields 
which are more crowded with patents and that are more likely to spawn a 
lot of litigation.75 To the extent that the course of scientific research is 
directed away from the most promising areas and down these second-
choice pursuits, this impedes scientific progress and creates real and 
tangible social costs.   
 
IV. THE TRADITIONAL ANSWER: SUBSIDIES 
A.  Overview and Direct Effects 
 
The traditional economic solution to the monopoly production 
problem is for the government to subsidize production by paying a fixed 
amount to the monopolist for every unit sold.  The idea is that this 
payment by the government increases the monopolist’s profit per unit, 
helping to offset the profits the monopolist would lose from lowering her 
price,76 and inducing the monopolist to raise her output.  The amount of 
the subsidy is chosen to ensure equilibrium at the competitive market price 
and quantity.77 In theory, the costs of the subsidy are recoverable via an 
 
£850,000 “for a trial in which the only issue was one of construction of a very short and 
easily comprehensible patent dealing [with] comparatively simple chemistry”). 
74 Id. 
75 See Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J.L. & ECON. 463, 465 
(1995).   
76 See footnote 35, supra. Monopolists essentially choose their production levels based 
on the tradeoff between profit per unit sold and quantity sold.  Because demand curves 
are generally downward sloping, price—and, therefore, profit per unit—is higher when 
the monopolist reduces her production level.  By paying a subsidy, the government raises 
the monopolist’s profit per unit, incenting the monopolist to increase the quantity of units 
she produces.   
77 Of course, the competitive equilibrium need not be the targeted equilibrium.  A smaller 
subsidy will move the market equilibrium toward the competitive equilibrium, lowering 
the price that consumers pay and increasing the output that firms produce.  A larger 
25
administratively costless lump sum tax on the monopolist, so that, 
ultimately, consumer and producer surplus is the same as it would be if the 
good were produced in a perfectly competitive market.   
In reality, however, this is seldom workable.  Lump sum taxes on 
individual corporations are not a realistic policy measure; the federal 
government collects most of its revenues from the federal income tax, 
which is levied on consumers.78 This means that these payments, 
ostensibly made to benefit consumers, are actually coming out of the 
consumers’ pockets;79 the real beneficiary is the firm whose goods are 
subsidized.  Even if one discounts these distributional concerns, these 
taxes have distortionary effects which reduce social welfare.80 
In practice, a subsidy is actually an externality intentionally 
imposed by the government:81 Ordinarily, when someone chooses 
whether or not to purchase a good, they both bear all the benefit of the 
purchase—i.e., they get to own the good—and all the cost of the purchase, 
in the form of paying the purchase price.  However, under a subsidy, a 
portion of the purchase price is paid by the government, not by the 
purchaser.  Thus, whenever someone decides to purchase the good, she 
imposes a small cost on every other taxpayer.  However, since the 
purchaser does not bear this cost, she will not take it into account when 
 
subsidy will move the equilibrium beyond the competitive outcome, lowering price 
below the cost of production and raising output accordingly.  For simplicity, we generally 
focus on the case where the chosen subsidy creates the competitive market equilibrium, 
but the discussion below is essentially equivalent under these scenarios, with the effects 
changing by a matter of degree.   
78 For example, in 2006 raised over 78% of its revenue from the individual income tax 
and social insurance taxes.  See CONG’L BUDGET OFFICE, CBO’S BASELINE BUDGET 
PROJECTIONS 1 (2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/budget/budproj.shtml.  
79 Of course, it also bears noting that the subsidy the company receives is ultimately 
passed on to its shareholders, who are consumers.  The more evenly that ownership of the 
company is dispersed among the populace, the less sense it makes to talk about the 
company and consumers as different groups.  Indeed, if consumers have identical 
preferences and an identical ownership share, a subsidy scheme that creates the 
competitive market equilibrium will maximize welfare if taxes are administratively 
costless and non-distortionary.  However, the probability of such a scenario arising is 
vanishingly small.  Accordingly, I will distinguish between consumers and producers so 
as to paint the clearest possible picture.  I leave it to the reader to remember and consider 
that producers are ultimately composed of consumers.   
80 The positive aspect of this is that the funds to pay for the subsidy are likely raised by 
income taxes, which generally have less distortionary impact than other taxes.  The 
negative aspect is that subsidies tend to be very expensive, requiring a larger tax than an 
optional patent purchase system.  See discussion in Part V, infra. A full subsidy of a true 
monopoly could easily be so expensive that the taxes necessary to fund it would actually 
create a greater deadweight loss than the monopoly itself.  
81 Note that this can also make subsidies, like taxes, an excellent tool for addressing 
externalities.   
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making her purchasing decisions.82 The purchaser will therefore purchase 
the good as if it were being sold at a lower price than it actually is; 
consequently, she will buy more of the subsidized good than she would 
otherwise.83 Thus, everyone who receives the subsidy will exhibit this 
same behavior, and will purchase a higher quantity of the good than she 
would without the subsidy.  Indeed, this is precisely the point of the 
subsidy; to change the outcome relative to that which would be observed 
under unregulated monopoly market conditions.  At the end of the day, the 
average citizen’s consumption level will be the same as it would have 
been in the competitive market outcome.84 
But each time a citizen makes a purchase, the government makes a 
payment to the company.  To fund those payments, the government levies 
taxes on consumers—the same consumers who are making those 
purchases in the first place.85 Thus, everyone imposes a negative 
externality on everyone else—but everyone also has a negative externality 
imposed on them by everyone else.  If each citizen were faced with the 
full price of the good—the price they pay plus the cost of the subsidy—
they would choose to consume far less of the good than they will under the 
subsidy regime.86 The subsidy system thus channels far more money and 
surplus from consumers to producers than a competitive market would.87 
A firm receiving a subsidy earns profits far in excess of what it would 
 
82 Technically, a small portion of the amount contributed by the government is paid by 
the purchaser in the form of higher taxes, either in the present or in the future.  However, 
this component is so small as to be effectively negligible.   
83 While consumption of some goods decreases when their price decreases, these goods 
are exceptional.  They tend to be extremely high-end luxury goods, such as Porsches, and 
extremely low-end goods, such as SPAM.  See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER 
217-18 (2001).  These goods are very much in the minority, and are particularly unlikely 
to be subsidized.  We therefore do not consider them any further.   
84 Assuming that the cost of the taxes to pay for the subsidy has a negligible income 
effect on consumers’ demand for the subsidized good.  Of course, any income effect that 
does exist can itself be compensated for by further increasing the size of the subsidy, but 
this is an additional level of recursive complexity that we need not consider here.   
85 Of course, this is an oversimplification.  While the income tax is by far the federal 
government’s largest source of revenue, taxes may be levied on a discrete group of 
consumers instead of the entire populace at large.  Similarly, all citizens may not be 
purchasers of the subsidized product.  But, in the interests of simplicity, I generally 
assume that tax burdens fall equally on all members of the population, and that all 
members of the population have identical demand for a product.   
86 This corresponds exactly to the unregulated monopoly market.  Since the subsidy 
system was imposed with the explicit goal of increasing consumption, it becomes clear 
that dismantling the subsidy regime will reduce consumption.   
87 However, if taxes are non-distortionary and administratively costless, total social 
welfare does increase; hence the attraction of the traditional economic view of subsidies, 
wherein they are financed by an administratively costless lump sum (and thus non-
distortionary) tax.  Taxing the producer has the added benefit of squelching any 
distributional issues.   
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receive if it merely held a monopoly under patent.  Consumers, the 
supposed beneficiaries of a subsidy, are actually much worse off in the 
aggregate than they would be in an unregulated monopoly system.88 
This additional producer surplus is perhaps subsidies’ most 
important and fundamental flaw:  To the extent that subsidies are 
anticipated, they dramatically overincent the development of the 
subsidized technology.89 All else equal, firms therefore have much 
stronger incentives to develop goods whose production will be subsidized 
than they do to develop other goods.  Moreover, there is good reason to 
believe that subsidies can be anticipated; currently, subsidies are generally 
awarded only after significant lobbying efforts.  Subsidies therefore create 
significant direct distortions relative to patent.90 
Subsidies can also be perceived as the government transferring 
taxpayer dollars to the coffers of large corporations—special interests.  
Public distrust of these special interests can make subsidies politically 
difficult or impossible.91 
Another problem with a subsidy program is that the government 
must predict the correct subsidy to achieve the competitive production 
output level.  A subsidy that is too low is not overly bad; although it 
results in output below the competitive market level, it does raise output 
above the monopoly level, and it costs less than the “correct” subsidy 
 
88 Put another way, monopolists are rational entities that maximize their own profits.  
Once they receive a subsidy, their set of options—and, concomitantly, their expected 
profit—expands.  If a monopolist under a subsidy produced the same amount of output as 
it did under the non-subsidized monopoly equilibrium, its profits would exceed those 
under the monopoly equilibrium.  This is because the revenue it receives per unit sold has 
been increased by the amount of the subsidy, while the number of units it sells, as well as 
its underlying cost structure, have remained unchanged.  However, the monopolist 
chooses to produce at an even higher level under the subsidy; its profits at this 
equilibrium must thus be higher still.  These profits come from payments by consumers, 
and they would not have chosen a lower level of consumption if they had initially 
realized the full extent of the cost they must bear; thus, consumers’ welfare is lower 
under the subsidy regime.    
89 Also worth noting is that this extra potential producer surplus is likely to attract 
significant lobbying efforts by the potential recipients.  These expenditures—whose sole 
effect is to redistribute utility and which do not promote any social goal—constitute a real 
social cost.  See, e.g., Duffy, supra note 17, at 44-45. 
90 Some might argue that, to some extent, this is a good thing, since patent only bestows a 
portion of the social value of the good on its inventor, underincenting development 
relative to the social optimum.  Nonetheless, even many diehard efficiency devotees 
would balk at the incentives created by subsidy; under basic assumptions (linear, 
downward-sloping demand curve; constant, positive cost of production), the monopolist’s 
profit under subsidy is double the social value of the subsidized good.   
91 On the other hand, to the extent that they are transfers of taxpayer dollars to special 
interests, these interests are often willing to engage in significant lobbying efforts.   
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would.92 A subsidy that is too high, however, is much worse:  First, it 
costs far more than the “correct” subsidy, as the populace both pays more 
per unit93 and pays over more units.94 Second, a subsidy that is too high 
raises the monopolist’s output above the socially efficient level, which 
means that some of the goods produced will cost more to make than 
society values them.  From a social welfare perspective, this represents 
pure waste.   
 
B.  Secondary Effects 
 
The secondary effects of subsidies are even more interesting.  
Suppose that a firm has just patented a new, useful technology, and enjoys 
a monopoly as a result.  The government, hoping to offset monopoly’s 
social waste, implements a subsidy designed to achieve the competitive 
market production level.   
Now consider the incentives of a rival firm to develop a competing 
technology.  If it enters the market,95 the rival firm will face the same 
environment it would face if the first good were being sold at the 
competitive price.96 In the sense that, unlike the patent system, it does not 
overincent the development of substitutes by linking the profits reaped 
from the intrinsic value of the new technology to the profits reaped from 
acquiring a position as a duopolist, this is a positive result.   
However, the good is not really being sold at the competitive price; 
in effect, the sale price is the competitive price plus the amount of the 
subsidy.  Since consumers ultimately bear this full cost through their tax 
burden, this means there is a real disconnect between the price that 
consumers ultimately pay and the market price that would-be 
manufacturers of potential substitutes observe.  Thus, the subsidy 
discourages other firms from developing substitutes,97 which ensures that 
the subsidy will have to be maintained throughout the duration of the 
patent.98 Reliance on a subsidy perpetuates further reliance on the 
subsidy.  The government may correct this outcome by subsidizing the 
second technology.99 However, if firms anticipate this,100 they will 
 
92 The smaller the subsidy, the better off consumers are in the aggregate.  This makes 
sense in light of the externality discussions above. 
93 This is because the subsidy is higher.   
94 This is because the higher subsidy induces the monopolist to increase her production.   
95 We assume that the rival firm is unable to secure a subsidy of its own.   
96 This is because the price consumers face when they choose whether or not to purchase 
the good is, by the design of the subsidy, the competitive market price.   
97 Relative to the patent system, that is; it is equivalent to a world in which the subsidized 
product was produced at its competitive market price and quantity.   
98 In order to keep production at its competitive market level.   
99 Or, of course, removing the subsidy on the first technology. 
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consider the value of future subsidies when deciding what technologies to 
research and how many resources to commit.  Once again, the government 
will be overincenting development of substitutes, just as it did under 
patent.101 
The presence of the subsidy also changes the behavior of other 
economic actors.  Because consumers are only paying the competitive 
price when they purchase the subsidized good, they will make planning 
decisions on this basis.  In reality, however, the government is also 
making payments to the monopolist on every unit that is purchased.  The 
purchaser’s calculus does not include the social cost, in the form of 
deadweight loss, created by the taxes the government must levy in order to 
make these payments.  This will sometimes lead to socially inefficient 
outcomes.   
For example, suppose that a certain useful chemical used in an 
industrial cleaning process is patented and subsidized.  Now suppose that a 
potential user of the chemical has a choice between two equally effective 
cleaning systems which both use that chemical:  The first is a cheaper, less 
sophisticated system that uses a larger quantity of the chemical.  The 
second is more expensive and sophisticated, but consequently is more 
efficient, in that it achieves the same result while using a lesser amount of 
the chemical.  Because the user only contributes a portion of the social 
resources necessary to purchase the chemical, she will be more likely to 
choose the first system.  The user might have made a different decision if 
she had to bear the full social cost—i.e., if she also bore the social cost of 
the taxes required to pay for the subsidy on the chemical.102 
This concern also applies to the consumption of substitutes to 
subsidized goods.  Sticking with the industrial cleaner example, suppose 
that a second chemical becomes available with similar uses.103 This 
chemical faces an artificial disadvantage in the marketplace because its 
competitor is subsidized.  This is particularly worrisome because a shift 
from purchases of the subsidized good to the substitute would mean the 
government paid the producer of the subsidized good less, and, 
concomitantly, a reduced deadweight loss from taxation.  Thus, while the 
 
100 And, since firms are currently likely to be able to secure subsidies for their products 
only after significant lobbying, there is at least an argument to be made that firms have a 
fair amount of ability to predict when their products will be subsidized.  See discussion 
Part IV.A, supra.
101 On the plus side, it only costs half as much to subsidize a duopolistic market into a 
competitive equilibrium as it would to subsidize a monopolistic one.  Compare 
EQUATION B1, infra with EQUATION E2, infra.
102 This analysis does not consider distributional concerns, but including them only 
strengthens this argument. 
103 As discussed above, this chemical is less likely to be developed than it would be under 
the patent system.  Nonetheless, we now consider what happens once it has been 
developed.   
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subsidy promotes social welfare by not overincenting imitative technology 
the way that patent does,104 it has other problems.   
Subsidies also have important effects on the development and 
distribution of complementary products.  Under a subsidy system, the 
incentives to develop complementary products are higher than the social 
optimum.  Because consumers will behave as if the original product were 
being sold at its competitive market price, firms will have the same 
incentives to develop complements as they would if the product were 
being produced in a competitive market.  The problem this raises 
resembles that raised by substitutes; the real price is not the competitive 
price, but the competitive price plus the amount of the subsidy.  This 
transfer payment must be raised through distortionary taxes which reduce 
social welfare. 
Once a complement to a subsidized good is developed, in an 
important sense, the subsidy on the initial product becomes shared 
between it and its complement.  Consider two companies, X and Y, 
producing complementary products.  If Company X’s product is 
subsidized, then, from Company Y’s perspective, this is the effective 
equivalent of a reduction in the price of Company X’s product.  This will 
shift the demand curve that Company Y faces.105 In response, Company Y 
is likely to change its behavior by raising its price.106 Thus, Company Y 
reaps great benefits from the subsidy.  For consumers,107 this means an 
increase in the price of the bundle—just as if the subsidy had been a 
smaller one.   
Further, a monopolist under a subsidy remains free to change her 
price and quantity in response to market conditions.  While flexibility to 
market conditions is generally a good thing, it can be problematic here.  
Market actors will rely on the low price of the subsidized good when they 
make decisions, and this will change the shape of the demand curve for the 
 
104 As discussed above, a benefit of the subsidy system relative to unmodified patent is 
that it does not overincent the development of substitutes by linking the profits reaped 
from the intrinsic value of the new technology to the profits reaped from acquiring a 
position as a duopolist.   
105 This is because many consumers will consider X and Y’s products as a package.  Once 
Company X has reduced the price of its product, that package is cheaper at any given 
price of Y’s product.  Accordingly, the demand curve for Y’s product shifts.  Note that 
this is the other side of the complements problem observed in patent, where the price of 
the bundle became more expensive when the price of either of the two individual goods 
was increased.  
106 Company Y’s output will then be below the competitive level, but above the level it 
would be at if both companies operated in an unmodified patent system.   
107 Company X will also respond to Company Y’s change in price by changing its price; 
Company Y will react in turn, etc.  Since the primary concern of this paper is the results 
at equilibrium, I do not devote much time to the consideration of the exact path by which 
it is achieved.   
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good.108 After the demand curve has changed shape, the monopolist will 
likely want to change her price and output level in response, ultimately 
creating further inefficiencies.  The monopolist’s actions can render a 
previously correctly sized subsidy either too large or too small.  
Subsequent adjustments to the subsidy in response to changed market 
conditions can restart this same process.   
An example is helpful in driving home this point.  Imagine that a 
private party has built a bridge that significantly shortens the daily 
commute for many people.  Drivers who wish to use the bridge must pay a 
toll of $5.  The government then intercedes by imposing a subsidy; they 
pay $2 of this toll.  Commuters using the bridge now have, by assumption, 
a significantly shorter commute.  Accordingly, they will be less concerned 
with the gas mileage of the cars they buy, and on the whole they will be 
likely to shift towards cars that get poorer gas mileage.  Commuters who 
previously chose mass transit systems may also be induced to purchase 
cars.  People may move closer to the bridge, and farther from other routes.  
They may move to areas that, before the bridge was built, had commutes 
that they considered to be too long.  In these ways, the commuters will 
become more dependent on the bridge.  The company that owns the bridge 
will realize that its bridge has now become more valuable, and will 
increase its toll accordingly.  The government then faces the choice of 
either increasing the subsidy to match or allowing the market equilibrium 
to shift away from that which it originally envisioned.109 
It is also possible that other market actors will anticipate the future 
behavior of the monopolist, and will choose not to rely on the subsidized 
price in their long-term planning.  However, to the extent that this is the 
case, the subsidy has not accomplished its intended purpose of moving the 
market equilibrium to its competitive level.  Moreover, assuming that 
there are no additional costs when more consumers rely on the bridge,110 it 
is socially beneficial for consumers to rely on the bridge when making 
their planning decisions.111 Thus, to the extent that consumers do not rely 
on its existence, this also represents social waste.   
Monopoly control of such a resource thus presents a double-edged 
sword:  If consumers rely on that resource’s availability at a given price, 
they make themselves dependent upon it, and therefore vulnerable to later 
 
108 In the short run, at the very least.   
109 These same reliance effects would also occur without the subsidy.  However, to the 
extent that a subsidy is imposed for the purpose of achieving a particular market 
equilibrium, the monopolist response dynamic may greatly complicate this goal.   
110 Such costs would include additional wear and tear on the bridge and increased delays 
to other bridge users because of traffic.   
111 This analogy does not work particularly well for a physical thing, such as a bridge, 
which has limited capacity.  However, it works very well in the case of an idea or other 
piece of intellectual property, since such an item’s utility is not diminished by successive 
users, nor does its use by one individual prevent its use by others.   
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attempts by the monopolist to exploit that dependence.  If consumers 
anticipate this future monopolistic preying, they are effectively behaving 
as if the good is already being sold at this higher price.  This further 
reduces their consumption below what would otherwise be the monopoly 
equilibrium level—a level of consumption that itself already represents a 
significant reduction from the competitive market equilibrium.   
 
V. THE OPTIONAL PATENT PURCHASING SYSTEM 
A.  Overview and Direct Effects 
 
We now consider an alternative to the current system in which the 
government has the option of buying a patent from its owner.  The 
government must purchase the patent just like any private buyer would; 
the patent holder is under no obligation whatsoever to sell to the 
government, and remains perfectly free to maintain her ownership of the 
patent and consequent monopoly profits.  To induce the patent holder to 
sell her patent, the government will have to offer her an amount greater 
than or equal to what she would earn from monopoly profits.  Unlike a 
mandatory program, this voluntary aspect ensures that the government 
cannot force companies to accept lower profits, preserving their research 
and development incentives. 
If the government successfully acquires the patent, it licenses it for 
free to anyone who wants to use the patent for any purpose, effectively 
making it available to all interested parties at no cost.  For industries 
where there are many firms with the capability to produce the good, it 
would be sold at the competitive market price.112 The funds for patent 
purchasing would come from general tax revenues.   
The market equilibrium under such a regime is depicted 
graphically in Figure 5.1, below.  Notice that the considerable deadweight 
loss present under the patent system, depicted graphically above in Figure 
3.2,113 has been completely eliminated and primarily converted to 
 
112 This last component—that the item ultimately be produced by the private sector 
instead of the government—is essential.  Maintaining an industry’s ability to carry a good 
through all phases of the production process ensures that selling the product in the market 
remains a realistic option for companies developing new technologies and goods.  If the 
government controls these channels, there will be no private sector check on the 
government’s ability to cheat down the price it pays for patents, eroding research 
incentives and ultimately stemming the flow of innovation.  To preserve the voluntary 
nature of the patentholder’s decision, the government’s purchasing decision must be 
completely separated from the decision to grant the applicant’s request for a patent. 
113 Figure 3.2 also graphically demonstrates that, assuming a linear, downward-sloping 
demand curve and constant, positive cost of production, a monopolistic market creates a 
deadweight loss that is exactly one-half the size of the monopolist’s profits.   
33
consumer surplus.114 This represents a tremendous social improvement 
relative to the waste of the patent system.  
 
A bit of clarification is in order here.  The monopolist will only be 
willing to sell her patent for a price that exceeds the profit she expects to 
achieve as a monopolist.  Monopoly profit represents the maximum profit 
a producer can achieve; there is therefore no reason for any private agent 
to purchase the patent for any more than this sum.115 The government is 
willing to pay more than this amount because its motives are 
fundamentally different from those of a private purchaser.  The 
government does not seek to maximize its profits; its goal is to maximize 
its citizens’ utility.  It does that here by eliminating the deadweight loss 
from monopoly116 and the other social inefficiencies that patent creates.117 
114 Note that Figure 5.1 does not consider the deadweight loss created by the taxes the 
government imposes to raise the funds it uses to purchase the patent from its owner.   
115 Assuming that the new buyer can not market the product better, produce it cheaper, or 
function as a more perfect monopolist.   
116 This can be seen graphically by comparing Figures 3.2 and 5.1, above.   
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It is the only entity with these incentives and it is therefore the only entity 
willing to pay this much.118 
We see then that if the government successfully purchases a patent 
at a price just above the would-be monopolist’s profit,119 the result is a 
Pareto improvement:120 The patent holder is better off, as she has earned 
more profits than she would under patent.  Consumers are better off121 
because they are capturing the benefit of what had previously been so 
much deadweight loss.122 
It is important to note that the taxes to raise these funds are not 
costless.123 Taxes create market distortions and deadweight loss of their 
own, detracting from social welfare.  However, one would expect 
significantly less deadweight loss to result from raising an amount equal to 
the monopolist’s profits through income taxes than would result from the 
monopolist’s unchecked market behavior.124 Accordingly, while patent 
purchasing can fairly be characterized as trading off one type of 
deadweight loss—that from monopoly pricing—for another—that of 
 
118 In theory, there could be some sort of charity or other altruistic benefactor who would 
have the same motives.  However, a patent whose social value is sufficiently high to 
attract this sort of philanthropic attention is also likely to carry a purchase price that 
would be prohibitively expensive.  Beyond this practical constraint, if the government 
were actually purchasing patents, it would only make sense for the charity to bid on 
patents that the government was not interested in purchasing; if both entities intended to 
put the patent into the public domain, there would be no reason for them to bid against 
each other, and presumably each would prefer to preserve its own funds as much as 
possible.    
119 Because firms receive only slightly more compensation for selling their patent to the 
government than they do from exercising their patent rights, the rent-seeking concerns 
engendered by a subsidy system are correspondingly lessened.  See discussion at footnote 
89, supra; see also Duffy, supra note 17, at 44-45.  
120 It is worth noting that this analysis is being done at a group level, not at the level of 
individual consumers.  It is likely that there will be some consumers who do not receive a 
benefit from the patent being placed into the public domain (i.e. those who don’t use it), 
but who pay higher taxes as a result of the purchase.  For them, patent purchasing is not a 
Pareto improvement.  However, on average and over time, all consumers might be 
expected to gain more from having the patents they do utilize available at lower prices 
than they lose from increased taxes (and concomitant deadweight loss).   
121 Compare Figure 5.1, supra, with Figure 3.2, supra.
122 If one considers the government as an entity in this analysis, it would also be better off 
after such a purchase, as its goal was to improve the welfare of its citizens, and it has 
done so.  Another, easier, way to see that the government is at least as well off if it makes 
such a purchase is to recall that it made the purchase voluntarily.  Whatever its goals, if 
the government acts rationally to pursue them, it will only make the purchase if doing so 
furthers them.   
123 See also Duffy, supra note 17, at 42-43 (discussing same). 
124 See sources cited footnote 80, supra.
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taxation—there is good cause to believe that there are significant 
efficiency gains to be made from this trade.125 
Purchasing a patent costs much less than it would cost to impose a 
traditional subsidy regime.  Concomitantly, the taxes required to fund a 
patent purchase create much less deadweight loss than those required to 
fund a traditional subsidy.  Under fairly typical basic economic modeling 
assumptions,126 the government would only need to raise one fourth as 
much revenue to purchase the patent as it would need to raise to effect a 
subsidy.   
But in many cases, the greatest benefits of a government patent 
purchase would be derived from the efficiency gains of incenting 
development through income taxation instead of through monopolistic 
pricing; nor would they stem from achieving a subsidy’s effect while 
reducing the accompanying tax burden.  Instead, they may stem from the 
patent purchase’s efficient realignment of secondary incentives.  It is to 
these benefits that I now turn my attention.   
 
B.  Effects on Secondary Incentives 
 
Once a patent has been purchased, it enters the public domain, 
ensuring that other firms enter the market and drive price down to the 
competitive market level.  Because this leads to the competitive market 
equilibrium, it creates socially efficient incentives to develop both 
substitutes and complements—unlike the traditional patent system, which 
overincents the development of substitutes and underincents the 
development of complements.  I address each of these issues in turn.   
 
1.  Substitutes 
 
As discussed above, a major problem of the current patent system 
is that it overincents the development of substitutes.127 Under the patent 
system, a rival company’s incentives to develop a new product are 
twofold:  The company reaps the reward both for the improvement the 
new product represents relative to existing ones and the reward they 
receive from converting a monopolistic market into a duopolistic one.  In 
the vast majority of cases, the profits a company reaps from entering a 
duopoly will dwarf the profits stemming from the product’s marginal 
 
125 Of course, there are always exceptions.  If a monopolist could perfectly price-
discriminate, the monopoly outcome would be socially efficient, and imposing taxes with 
which to purchase the patent would lead to a net utility loss.  Perfectly price-
discriminating monopolists are exceedingly rare, however.   
126 I.e., linear, downward-sloping demand curve and constant, positive marginal cost of 
production.    
127 See Part III.B, supra.
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improvements relative to previously existing products.  From a social 
welfare perspective, these research monies would be better spent 
elsewhere.  
Under a patent purchase system, however, companies reap only the 
reward they derive from the intrinsic value of their innovation; i.e., its 
marginal value relative to existing products.  Once the government has 
bought the patent rights to the first product, it will become available in the 
marketplace at its cost of production.  If a company develops a second, 
similar product, they will not be able to charge a very high price for it, as 
there is already a cheap substitute of substantial quality available.  This 
makes the company’s patent right in the new technology much less 
valuable than it would be if the first product were not already on the 
market.  The result is the same as that which results from the competitive 
market equilibrium.   
Some readers may respond that the optional patent purchase 
system goes too far—that unlike patent, it actually discourages companies 
from making innovations.  However, from an economic standpoint, this 
argument is incorrect.  If the new product costs the same to produce as the 
existing product, but creates more value for its owner than the previously 
existing product, then the new inventor can charge a price higher than that 
of the existing product (but less than the price of the existing product plus 
the increase in value of the new product) and make a profit.128 This is 
ideal, as it guarantees that substitutes will only be developed so long as 
their social benefits exceed their cost of development.  The optional patent 
purchase system does not deter all improvements; it curtails socially 
wasteful innovations in favor of more socially beneficial ones.129 
Yet this raises an important issue:  In light of the implications a 
purchased patent has for potential competitors in the industry, some may 
be concerned that the sale to the government is far less voluntary than it 
may appear.  More specifically, one might worry that a company must 
take whatever the government offers, for, if they do not, another company 
will develop a substitute—and then sell the government the patent for that 
 
128 Note that this would yield a profit because, by assumption, the cost of production of 
the new product is the same as that of the old product.   
129 Some industries have upward sloping production cost curves characterized by 
increasing marginal cost of production.  In these industries, having substitutes creates 
social efficiencies because they allow the previous industry to operate at a lower level of 
production, which, by assumption, entails an even higher reduction in the level of 
resources that must be committed.  Thus these industries, in a certain sense, naturally 
incent the development of substitutes, and will continue to do so under a patent 
purchasing regime.  Note, however, that this incentive is socially efficient, as it comes 
from a reduction in the amount of resources society must expend, unlike the incentives 
created under patent, which are merely artifacts of a market distortion, not the creation of 
true social value.   
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substitute.  This will introduce a cheaply priced substitute to the market 
that will decimate the first company’s profits.   
However, this concern is grossly overstated, at least in some 
industries.  The second company will anticipate that if it develops a 
substitute, the first company will know,130 and will offer to sell its patent 
to the government at a slightly cheaper price.  This will create a bidding 
war that will decimate the second company’s expected profits.  
Anticipating this, the second company will be much more likely to pursue 
alternative avenues of research, obviating this concern.   
In fact, we can go further:  It is likely that if the second company 
anticipates that it will find itself competing with the first company to sell 
its patent to the government, it will develop a product when doing so 
would be profitable even if the original product were being sold at its 
competitive price.131 Phrased another way, if firms assume that the 
government is willing to purchase a subsequent patent, the optional patent 
purchasing system will create incentives to develop substitutes that closely 
mirror those of a competitive market even when the holder of a patent opts 
against selling her patent.   
This is a somewhat surprising result, and not an entirely positive 
one.  Previous discussion has focused on how the patent system 
overincents the development of substitutes relative to the competitive 
market.  However, the deadweight loss that results from a monopoly 
created by the patent system may be artificial, but it is still a real social 
loss.  Though patent still provides subsequent innovators with a private 
incentive that exceeds the social loss they eliminate,132 it is likely that this 
overincentive is better than having no incentive to remedy this market 
failure at all, which is essentially what subsequent innovators would face 
 
130 There are industries where trade secrecy prevents firms from knowing what their 
rivals are working on.  However, as long as the purchases the government is considering 
are publicly announced in advance, the first company would still have an opportunity to 
undercut the second’s auction price.  The second company will anticipate this, and this 
will discourage duplicative research.    
131 The lowest sale price that firm two will be willing to accept corresponds to the profits 
that it would receive if the government chooses to purchase firm one’s product—an 
amount that corresponds to the profits it would receive if it entered the market when the 
first firm’s product was being sold at its competitive market price. Firm one will be in a 
parallel situation.  If firm one’s patent is purchased, then the second firm’s subsequent 
profits will be those profits it would receive if it entered the market when the first firm’s 
product was being sold at its competitive market price.  If firm two’s patent is purchased, 
it will likely be at a price that is only slightly higher than the profits it would have made 
if it had entered the market when the first firm’s product was being sold at its competitive 
market price.    
132 See footnote 36, supra.
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if they assume that the government will purchase one of the two substitute 
patents.133 
However, this problem is easily solved by imposing a firm 
government policy against buying subsequent substitute patents.134 That 
way, if the government does not purchase the initial patent, subsequent 
innovators have the same incentives to develop substitutes as they have 
under patent, leaving us no worse off than we currently are.  On the other 
hand, if the government does purchase the initial patent, the product 
becomes available at its competitive market price and quantity, and 
subsequent innovators have the socially optimal incentives to develop 
substitutes.  Such a government policy essentially renders the optional 
patent purchase system a Pareto improvement over the patent system and 
completely moots the complicated industrial organizational effects that 
substitute patent purchasing would create.135 
2.  Complements 
 
Just as the optional patent purchase system reduces the patent 
system’s inefficiently high private incentives to develop substitutes, so too 
does it ameliorate patent’s inefficiently low private incentives to develop 
complements.  In fact, there is great reason to believe that the optional 
patent purchase system will significantly encourage many secondary 
improvements.   
A major problem with patents is that, because patents convey a 
property right, the owner of the patented technology may be able to 
 
133 See footnote 36, supra. Calculating crudely, an incentive that is .6 times too large is 
likely better than an incentive that is 1.0 times too small.   
134 There may be a commitment problem here:  The government would like to convince 
the second firm that faces the high private incentives of the patent system to develop 
substitutes in order to induce it to create a substitute.  However, once it has done so, the 
government would prefer that it purchase one of the substitutes’ patent by auction in 
order to eliminate the deadweight loss that accompanies a duopoly.  On the plus side, if 
the government’s commitment is substantial but not perfect (so that it generally does not 
buy substitute patents but makes some exceptions) then this will serve to dampen the 
overly high private incentives provided by patent, see footnote 36, supra, rendering them 
closer to the actual social value created by converting a monopolistic market into a 
duopolistic one.   
135 Actually, by credibly announcing its intention to buy one of the two patents at some 
probability, the government could provide a private incentive equal to any value ranging 
from the competitive market incentive to the patent incentive.  In theory, then, the 
government could set the private incentive to develop a substitute equal to the social loss 
that would be ameliorated by the development of that substitute.  However, expecting the 
government to be able to make all of the relevant calculations correctly and then execute 
such a plan is likely asking too much.  In any event, for the purposes of this paper, it 
suffices to note the benefits of a government policy against purchasing subsequent 
substitutes, to assume the imposition of such a policy, and to note that superior policies 
may also be possible.   
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effectively prevent others from improving it.  The optional patent 
purchasing system completely solves this problem by removing the 
property right that creates it136: Instead of using a patent’s exclusionary 
power as a strategic bargaining tool against would-be innovators, the 
government freely licenses the patent to all.   
Patent purchasing provides an equally efficacious solution to the 
double marginalization problem:  Because the government makes the 
patent freely available to all, the machinations of the marketplace will 
reduce the price of the patented good to its competitive market level.  The 
double mark-up problem thus reduces to that of a single monopolist.137 
Additionally, while the subsequent development of substitutes 
provides significant challenges for the optional patent purchase system, 
the subsequent development of complements provides tremendous 
opportunity.  The root cause of this is the double marginalization problem:  
Recall that because each monopolist considers only her own profits, each 
will not consider how raising her own price will reduce her 
complementary monopolist’s sales.  As a result, each monopolist will raise 
her price, not only above the competitive level, but actually above the 
price that she would charge if both patents were held by a single 
monopolist.  This creates extreme inefficiencies, even relative to 
monopoly:  For every dollar of profit that the complementary monopolists 
earn, they generate twice the social waste that a single monopolist 
would.138 By purchasing both complementary patents, the government 
can eliminate all of this waste in one fell swoop.139 Even better, because 
complementary monopolies create twice as much social waste per dollar 
of producer surplus, the same amount of government spending generates 
twice as much social value.140 
B.  The Uncertainty Cost of Patent 
 
136 For patents that are purchased, that is.  Owners are still free to refuse to sell, and in 
such cases the potential for patent holdouts would persist.    
137 The subsequent innovator is the monopolist.  If the second patent holder’s patent is 
also purchased by the government, we arrive at the competitive market equilibrium.   
138 This corresponds to a full dollar’s worth of social waste being generated for every 
dollar of monopoly profit collected.  See footnote 113, supra. This extra waste also 
significantly expands the range of Pareto-improving purchase prices.  Given the 
difficulties that the government faces in calculating purchase prices, see discussion, infra,
this increased buffer zone is most welcome.   
139 It is possible that the monopolists will attempt to capture some of this newly created 
value through strategic bargaining behavior by holding out for a purchase price that, 
while still less than the social value created, is higher than the profits that the two 
companies would earn as double-marginalizing monopolists.   
140 The deadweight loss from the taxes required to finance that spending will be similarly 
reduced as well.   
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The patent purchase system also has the potential to ameliorate 
some of the uncertainty costs of patent in two important ways.  First, recall 
that, under patent, would-be monopolists attempt to construe their patent 
as broadly as possible in order to stymie potential competitors.  These 
same competitors have incentives, compounded by a patent holder’s 
supra-competitive pricing, to seek a niche that is just beyond the boundary 
of that patent.  As discussed in Part III.C, supra, these conflicting claims 
to title in a legally gray area frequently end in extremely costly litigation.   
However, once a patent is purchased, it enters the public domain, 
where it is available to all.  This eliminates the supra-competitive pricing 
that drives would-be competitors to seek a niche that is just beyond the 
boundary of that patent.  Far more importantly, it ensures that there is no 
one with either the ability or the motivation to bring suit for patent 
infringement.  In this way, purchasing a patent could greatly reduce the 
incidence of such expensive and socially wasteful litigation.   
 In a similar fashion, the elimination of lawsuits for patent 
infringement in cases of purchased patents will mean that researchers will 
no longer be deterred from carrying out research in certain fields because 
of concerns over the cost of defending themselves against a patent 
infringement lawsuit and their potential liability if they lose.  As discussed 
in Part III.C, supra, there is evidence that this is currently a significant 
problem under the patent system.  By removing these artificial roadblocks, 
the optional patent purchase system has the potential to redirect 
researchers away from their second-choice research topics and enable 
them to pursue their top preferences.  On the whole, these top choices are 
likely to be more promising than their second-choice topics.  By focusing 
research on the most promising areas, the patent purchase system has the 
potential to significantly hasten scientific progress relative to patent.     
 
C.  Pricing Problems and Mechanisms 
 
Thus far, we have focused on the broad outlines of the program 
and its implications; we have not yet considered the exact mechanics of 
the purchase itself in any depth.  However, as is frequently the case with 
such things, the devil is in the details.141 
As discussed previously, the patent holder will be unwilling to sell 
her patent unless the government offers her a purchase price that meets or 
exceeds the profits that she expects to earn under patent.  From a social 
utility perspective, the best result would be if the government is able to 
keep the purchase price as close to the monopoly profit level as possible, 
because that minimizes the amount of market-distorting taxes that must be 
 
141 See generally Duffy, supra note 17. 
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levied to finance the purchase.142 However, in order to effect such a 
result, the government must overcome two related, but distinct, problems:  
First, the government must arrive at a valuation of the patent.  Second, the 
government must actually negotiate the purchase.  I address each of these 
problems in turn. 
 
1.  The Valuation Problem 
 
The question of how the government reaches an estimate of a 
patent’s value presents a significant problem.  Calculating a patent’s 
market value is a task outside the normal realm of government, and one in 
which the government might reasonably be expected to have little 
expertise or institutional competency; indeed, the government’s inability 
to value patents and potential areas of research is one of the chief 
arguments commonly advanced against reward systems.143 
Before advancing further, however, it behooves us to reiterate that 
the government need not estimate profits with pinpoint accuracy.  The 
magnitude of the deadweight loss associated with monopoly production 
creates a significant buffer zone,144 and if the transaction is carried out at 
any price within that range, it will increase social utility.145 
Further, if the government is correct on average, but frequently errs 
in its calculations,146 this, by itself, may not be particularly troubling:  To 
maintain existing incentives, all that matters is that prices are neither 
systematically too high nor too low.  Since firms are rational profit-
maximizers, they will only be concerned with the expected value of their 
profits when choosing between different research pathways.147 If 
government value estimates are correct on average, firms will essentially 
choose the same research topics as they would if the government correctly 
estimated value in each individual case.  It seems likely that if firms are 
able to detect an upward or downward bias in the government’s estimates 
 
142 Assuming also that we want to maintain the level of development incentives for 
technology that the patent system provides.  If one thought that such incentives were too 
low, see, e.g., Shavell & Van Ypersele, supra note 8, at 529, one might wish that the 
purchase price had been higher.   
143 See, e.g., Duffy, supra note 17, at 42-44. 
144 For example, under fairly typical basic economic modeling assumptions, the 
magnitude of the deadweight loss created by patent is half the magnitude of the 
monopolist’s profits.  See footnote 113, supra.
145 As discussed before, a purchase that is executed at a price within this range is Pareto-
improving, without including the costs of taxes or the purchase’s salutary secondary 
effects.   
146 I.e., if its mean estimated profit is the mean actual profit, but its individual estimates 
fluctuate (have non-zero standard deviation).   
147 Unless, of course, firms are not actually risk-neutral.  However, this is a fairly 
standard economic modeling assumption.  Note, however, that non-systematic variance in 
government evaluations may not be a problem even when firms are not risk-neutral.  
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over time, the government will be able to as well.  If the government can 
detect its mistakes, it can compensate for them.148 
However, such inaccuracy may pose a serious problem if patent 
holders are much better at estimating the value of their inventions than the 
government is.  This is true even if both the government and private firms 
accurately predict value on average.  The problem is essentially one of 
adverse selection; firms will tend to accept those government bids that are 
too high, while rejecting those that are too low.  This has the same effect 
as systematically skewing the government’s estimates, as many patent 
purchases that would take place at the lower price simply do not happen.  
Since the company will earn monopoly profits when no purchase is made, 
and the expected value of a purchase will exceed monopoly profits, this 
will increase development incentives relative to their levels under 
patent.149 
A somewhat extreme example helps to illustrate this point:  
Suppose that firms always know the exact value of their patent, and that 
the government’s valuation is randomly and uniformly distributed between 
zero and double the patent’s true value.  This scenario is a good one for a 
compulsory prize system, as the government’s expected estimate is exactly 
the patent’s value; on average, such a system will create the correct 
incentives.  However, it will work very differently in the context of patent 
purchases:  Firms, exercising their discretion, will only accept the 
government’s offer when the government offers a price higher than the 
patent’s actual value.  Assuming that the government offered its valuation 
every time, such a scenario would mean only half of all sales would go 
through, and would lead to purchase prices that were too high by 50% on 
average.  This would increase development incentives by 25%,150 a 
significant deviation relative to the patent system.151 The government can 
 
148 To the extent that the patent purchase system provides greater rewards than the patent 
system does alone, research areas which do not generate political support may suffer in 
the sense that these fields will be less attractive in comparison to those falling under the 
purchase system.  This is likely to be a small effect, however, as the purchase system 
attempts to imitate the rewards of the patent system, and can be dealt with in other ways.   
149 Of course, there may be other ways of structuring the negotiation to avoid this 
problem.  For example, if patentholders submit buyout prices to the government, instead 
of having the government present an offer to the patentholders, companies may be 
induced to submit more accurate bids if the government’s budget constraint is sufficiently 
strong.   
150 The government would purchase half of all patents, and each of these would be bought 
for, on average, 50% more than the patent’s current, actual value.  The other half of 
patents would not be purchased, and would be worth their current, actual value.  Taken 
together, these two outcomes increase the a priori value of a patent—and, consequently, a 
firm’s incentives for development—by 25%.   
151 Note that, as discussed before, not all commentators would think that such deviation is 
a bad thing.  Many proponents of prize systems favor them because they can offer 
development incentives that are larger than those of patent.   
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counter this increase effectively by systematically lowering its bids, but 
this will result in fewer patents being purchased.152 
Even after all of this discussion of the potential pitfalls of 
valuation, we have not yet discussed any actual mechanism by which the 
government might arrive at its valuation.  Fortunately, there are many 
options to draw upon from both experience and theory.  Governments 
frequently make valuations of property; compensation paid to the owners 
of property condemned by the government under its eminent domain 
power provides perhaps the most obvious example.  Between 1998 and 
2002, there were over 46,000 condemnation filings in twenty-three states 
alone.153 To value properties, the government generally hires private 
appraisers, just like a private party would do.  And while the use of 
eminent domain authority has been controversial, very little of this 
controversy has stemmed from complaints that the government’s valuation 
mechanisms are faulty.154 
On the other hand, studies of individual governments’ eminent 
domain practices offer some reason to believe that valuation procedures 
may leave a great deal to be desired.  At least two studies have found that 
the owners of high-valued parcels were paid more than the market value of 
their property, while the owners of low-valued parcels were paid less than 
their property’s market value.155 Another, earlier study of one county’s 
exercise of eminent domain found that private property owners were 
 
152 For example, in the case discussed, suppose that the government responds by lowering 
its bids to be 75% of what it calculates to be the value of the patent.  Instead of offering 
prices that range from zero to double the patent’s actual worth, the government will now 
offer prices that range from zero to one-and-a-half times the patent’s actual worth.  
However, firms will only accept the government’s offer when the proposed price is at or 
above the patent’s actual worth; thus, only one-third of patents will be purchased.  These 
patents will be purchased for a price that is typically 25% higher than the patent’s actual 
value, creating a priori development incentives that are slightly over 8% higher than those 
of patent.   
153 See Dana Berliner, Public Power, Private Gain: A Five Year, State-By-State Report 
Examining the Abuse of Eminent Domain (2003), at http://www.castlecoalition.org/report 
(June 2, 2006) (listing the total number of condemnations filed in Alaska, Arizona, 
Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin).   
154 See, e.g., id.; Dana Berliner, Public Power, Private Gain: The Abuse of Eminent 
Domain, CAPITALISM (Feb. 14, 2005). 
155 See Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. POL. ECON. 473 
(1976) (analyzing condemnation proceedings for an urban renewal program in Chicago); 
Terrence M. Clauretie, William Kuhn, & R. Keith Schwer, Residential Properties Taken 
Under Eminent Domain:  Do Government Appraisers Track Market Values?, 26 J. REAL 
ESTATE RESEARCH 317 (2004) (analyzing properties seized through eminent domain in 
Clark County, Nevada); see also PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, REAL 
PROPERTY 159 (2003) (discussing Munch’s study).   
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systematically under-compensated.156 Additionally, condemnations 
almost always involve pieces of real property, an asset that is valued more 
frequently, and that likely is much easier to value, than pieces of 
intellectual property, such as patents.157 
Should the valuation methods traditionally used in eminent domain 
proceedings prove inadequate, the academic literature is rife with 
proposals to address this problem.  Most of these proposals have been put 
forth in the context of implementing prize systems.  While the optional 
patent purchase system is fundamentally different from a reward 
system,158 both systems face the same problem, in that both require the 
 
156 See Curtis J. Berger & Patrick J. Rohan, The Nassau County Study: An Empirical 
Look into the Practice of Condemnation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 430, 442-43 (1967) (finding 
that county appraisals had a significant downward bias, and that property owners 
frequently got considerably less than the already-low appraisal value: 56.9% of owners 
received less than 90% of the appraisal value and 8.6% received less than 50%); see also 
GOLDSTEIN & THOMPSON, supra note 155, at 159 (discussing Berger and Rohan’s study); 
Berliner, supra note 153, at 147 (stating that the owner of a condemned parcel was 
receiving $62 per square foot in compensation, but that a nearby parcel had been sold for 
$130 per square foot in a private transaction); Gideon Kanner, Feeding “Times”, NAT’L
L.J., Jan. 7, 2002, at A29 (discussing the same transaction).  But see Clauretie et al., 
supra note 155, at 325 (finding that, while government underpaid the owners of low-
valued properties, on average they overpaid property owners by 17%). 
157 Though, on a more positive note, the founding fathers apparently did not consider the 
difficulties inherent in valuing other forms of property to be sufficiently imposing to 
justify limiting the power of eminent domain to real property.  See, e.g., Kimball Laundry 
Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 10-11, 16 (1949) (holding that individuals are entitled to 
compensation for government takings of intangible property, and remanding to the 
district court to determine the value, if any, of such property); W. River Bridge Co. v. 
Dix, 6 How. 507, 533-34 (1848) (“A distinction has been attempted . . . between the 
power of a government to appropriate . . . [physical] property . . . and the like power in 
the government to resume or extinguish a franchise.  The distinction thus attempted we 
regard as a refinement which has no foundation in reason, and one that . . . avoids the true 
legal or constitutional question in these causes . . . .”); City of Oakland v. Oakland 
Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 838 (Cal. 1982) (“No constitutional restriction, federal or state, 
purports to limit the nature of the property that may be taken by eminent domain.”); 
accord Eminent Domain, 26 AM. JUR. 2D § 95.  
 Nor have concerns about the difficulty of valuation completely prevented 
governments from exercising eminent domain over personal property.  See, e.g., Long 
Island Water-Supply Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685 (1897) (addressing 
Brooklyn’s condemnation of contractual rights); W. River Bridge Co., 6 How. 507 
(addressing Vermont’s condemnation of a charter vesting the bridge company with the 
exclusive right to build a bridge over West River and the bridge that was built pursuant to 
that charter); Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835 (addressing Oakland’s attempt to condemn 
the Raiders); see also Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 964 (Ct. Cl. 1979) 
(holding that government infringement of a patent constituted a taking under eminent 
domain, and, accordingly, the Fifth Amendment’s “just compensation” requirement was 
the appropriate measure of damages).   
158 Reward systems generally operate as an alternative to intellectual property rights; the 
inventor does not retain ownership over her innovation.  The patent purchase system does 
award the inventor ownership, and merely provides society at large a mechanism for 
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government to calculate the value of an innovation.  Proposals which have 
been advanced in the context of prize systems therefore have potential 
application here. 
It is also worth noting that, under the patent purchase system, the 
valuation problem is significantly simpler than it is under a prize system.  
Since prize systems are generally intended as a way for the government to 
craft the incentives that innovators face, prize amounts must be established 
before a path of research is started, which can be many years before the 
invention will ever go to market.159 This can be particularly difficult with 
inventions whose very development will radically change the landscape of 
their industry.  The price of a patent purchase, by contrast, need only be 
determined at the time of purchase, by which point the technology has 
been commercialized.  Additionally, prize systems often focus on tying the 
reward the innovator faces directly to the social value of the innovation.160 
This requires a determination of how much utility an invention confers on 
society.  The purchase system, by contrast, merely requires an estimation 
of the profits that would be earned under patent, a comparatively simple 
question.161 
A detailed consideration of the merits and shortcomings of all 
these various proposals is beyond the scope of this paper.  However, it is 
worth noting just how varied the range of proposals is, as this highlights 
that, while the valuation problem is significant, there are numerous ways 
in which it might be approached.  Some have suggested the use of test 
 
purchasing it.  Reward systems are often touted because government selection of the 
prize level allows for greater tailoring of research incentives than does patent.  This 
feature is typically lauded not because it enables the government to better direct the flow 
of research for social engineering reasons, but because it tends to provide innovators with 
private incentives that are weaker than the total social value of the innovation (though not 
always; see discussion in Part III.B, supra).  The optional patent purchase system, on the 
other hand, is not intended as a mechanism to modify research incentives; it attempts to 
replicate the patent system’s levels as closely as possible.   
159 This can be a bigger problem than it may first appear.  Consider the likelihood the 
government would have had of correctly anticipating the economic value of the cotton 
gin, the electric light bulb, the automobile, or the personal computer many years before 
their time.  Similarly, the incredible extent to which technology can change in a relatively 
short time shows how easy it could be for the government to incent the development of 
hopelessly outdated inventions.  This is perhaps the greatest beauty of the patent system: 
Little is left to anyone’s discretion, as the market determines the reward an innovator 
receives.  
160 See, e.g., Shavell & Van Ypersele, supra note 8, at 530; Kremer, supra note 21, at 
1142. 
161 These facts notwithstanding, there are some valuation methods which are possible 
under a prize system that would be unlikely to work well under an optional patent 
purchase system.  Most notable among these are methods that fix the prize the 
government pays the investor ex post, based on a product’s sales after the technology has 
been placed in the public domain.  See, e.g., Shavell & Van Ypersele, supra note 8, at 
541-42; Abramowicz, supra note 15, at 228-29. 
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markets, i.e. placing the product on sale in a given geographic area for a 
period of time, then extrapolating the product’s value nationwide from the 
results.162 Others have suggested using auctions to calculate the value of 
patents, in the hope that, by inducing private parties to bid for the patent, 
the government will be able to harness their superior information and 
constrain its own discretion.163 Still other commentators have suggested 
such innovative ideas as having the government distribute coupons to 
consumers and observing the subsequent buying patterns, then using that 
data to determine the value of the patent.164 
To this somewhat lengthy list, I also add a new mechanism, one 
that I consider to be an extension of the valuation practices that 
government has historically used.  When governments condemn property 
under their eminent domain power, they engage private appraisers to 
estimate the value of the property at issue.  The underlying rationale is that 
it is fairer, more efficient, and more accurate for the government to rely on 
the expertise of private individuals who specialize in making such 
determinations.  Unfortunately for our purposes, unlike the case of real 
property, there is not a deep market for patent appraisers.  However, there 
is another type of expertise that is abundantly present in the private sector 
that may prove useful:  capital market analysts.   
Fortunes are made and lost in the stock and bond markets by 
predicting how the prices of various companies’ financial instruments will 
fluctuate over time.  The prices of a company’s financial instruments 
depend on that company’s expected profits; accordingly, there is a small 
army of analysts whose sole job is to estimate companies’ future profits 
from each of their various products.165 These analysts typically specialize 
 
162 See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 15, at 225-28 (2003); Robert C. Guell & Marvin 
Fischbaum, Toward Allocative Efficiency in the Prescription Drug Industry, 73 MILBANK 
Q.  213 (1995). 
163 See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 15; Kremer, supra note 21.  The details of these 
proposals vary considerably.  For example, some approaches, such as Kremer’s, require 
that the government randomize its purchases.   
 It is also worth noting that auction mechanisms are likely better suited for patent 
purchases than they are for prizes:  One of the chief problems in adapting auctions for the 
latter context lies in converting the auction bid’s measure of private value into a measure 
of social value.  A patent purchase system, on the other hand, requires only a measure of 
the patent’s private value.   
164 See Douglas Gary Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why the Government Should Subsidize 
the Purchase of Patented Pharmaceuticals, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123 (1997). 
165 Technically, these analysts’ official jobs are to make buy/hold/sell recommendations, 
but these are very tightly connected to earnings predictions.  See, e.g., Katherine 
Schipper, Commentary on Analysts’ Forecasts, 1991 ACCOUNTING HORIZONS 105, 112 
(“The basic responsibility of an analyst is to follow stocks—10 to 20 stocks in a given 
industry or economic sector. . . . Within the analyst’s report, the ultimate judgment 
recommending an explicit action is ‘buy, sell, or hold.’”).   
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by industry or economic sector, and typically have a broad range of data at 
their disposal.   
As accurate predictions can yield tremendous profits and 
inaccurate ones can cause financial ruin, there are significant ex ante 
reasons to suspect that these analysts’ predictions will be fairly accurate.  
However, we need not rely on mere theory alone; the accounting literature 
is replete with studies of how analysts make their decisions and on how 
accurate they are.166 Many studies of analysts across various industries 
tend to agree that their predictions tend to be slightly optimistic.  A study 
by Francis and Philbrick estimated that, on average, analysts overestimate 
earnings, but by less than ten percent.167 While these figures may still 
have greater error than some might like, they do seem substantially 
accurate, and the damage from such estimation errors is far outweighed by 
the amount of deadweight loss eradicated by the optional patent purchase 
system.168 Moreover, as the data available to analysts varies significantly 
by industry, there is substantial reason to believe that the value of certain 
types of patents can be predicted even more accurately.169 This is very 
encouraging indeed. 
In industries that are dominated by large, publicly traded 
corporations, these analysts could constitute a pool of expertise for valuing 
patents in much the same way that real estate appraisers have expertise in 
 
166 For a discussion of the main points of many such papers, see id. For a more general 
review of the literature on analysts’ forecasts, see D. Givoly & J. Lakonishok, Properties 
of Analysts’ Forecasts of Earnings: A Review and Analysis of the Research, 1984 J. 
ACCT. LITERATURE 117. 
167 See Jennifer Francis & Donna Philbrick, Analysts’ Decisions as Products of a Multi-
Task Environment, 31 J. ACCT. RES. 216, 217 (1993) (“For our full sample of VL analysts’ 
forecasts, we document average optimism of 9% of the EPS forecast . . . .”). 
168 See EQUATIONS C3 and C4, infra, which suggest that the optional patent purchase 
system is Pareto improving relative to the patent system so long as the purchase price is 
between 100% and 150% of what the patent holder would have earned in the market.   
169 There are other trends in analysts’ reports which are also of interest.  Analysts tend to 
be less optimistic about the stocks they recommend than those they do not.  Francis & 
Philbrick, supra note 167, at 217 (“The average optimism for sell stocks is 12% of the 
EPS forecast . . . and is significantly greater . . . than the average optimism for hold 
stocks (9% of the EPS forecast . . . ).  The average optimism for hold stocks is 
significantly greater than the average optimism for buy stocks (3% of the EPS forecast . . 
. ).”).  Francis and Philbrick suggest that this is done out of a desire to cultivate good 
relations with management, as they are an important source of information for an analyst.  
Id. at 225 (“We interpret these results as consistent with our conjecture that the optimistic 
forecasts are intended to cultivate or maintain management relations.”).  This suggests 
that analysts may pad their most negative analyses (i.e. their sell recommendations), and 
thus may in fact be making more accurate earnings predictions than they report.  Id. at 
229 (“We argue that analysts may not strive to produce earnings forecasts with minimal 
error in all circumstances . . . .”).  Modern analysts also have access to an ever-increasing 
supply of information and computing technology, which would also suggest improved 
forecasting accuracy. 
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valuing real property.  This suggests that there is a wealth of private 
pricing expertise that the government may be able to co-opt through 
contracting.  There are, of course, problems with this approach.  
Innovators may be able to induce private analysts to collude.  Over time, 
analysts could conceivably lose their expertise in predicting profit and 
replace it with expertise in predicting how much the government will be 
willing to pay.  It is also unclear how effective analysts’ contractual 
incentives will be; they may not be as strong as the discipline they would 
face in the market, and, in the long run, this could lead to less accurate 
predictions than those we currently see.170 
However, each of these problems, daunting as they may be, is 
equally problematic in the context of real estate appraisals.  As discussed 
previously, while government valuations in the eminent domain context 
have certainly been far from perfect, valuation problems have not proved 
insurmountable in that context.  Accordingly, there is good reason to 
believe that there is a significant class of patents—those pertaining to 
industries that are dominated by large, publicly traded companies—where 
the valuation problem can be overcome in a similar fashion.   
 
2.  The Negotiation Problem 
 
For the government, choosing a valuation is only half of the 
problem; there still remains the matter of negotiating an agreement with 
the inventor.  This negotiation is somewhat unusual:  Because the 
government has incentives that are fundamentally different from those of 
private actors, it is effectively guaranteed to be the only entity willing to 
pay enough money to purchase the patent from its owner.  On the other 
side of the table, the patent holder is the only entity capable of conveying 
the patent.  The results of these types of negotiations—i.e., 
monopsonistic171/monopolistic ones—cannot be predicted exactly from 
conventional economic theory.   
This does not imply that we can say nothing at all about such talks.  
It is obvious that the government will want to pay as little as possible, 
while the patent holder will want to secure as high a price as possible.  The 
lower bound of these two entities’ bargaining range is clear:  The patent 
holder will not accept any amount below that which she would be able to 
 
170 It is also worth noting that these analysts do not generally value individual patents 
specifically.  However, in certain instances, the valuation of a company is tightly tied to 
the valuation of its patents.     
171 A monopsony exists when there is only one buyer for a particular product; that buyer 
is a monopsonist.    
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earn from keeping her patent monopoly.172 There is also a somewhat 
natural but contestable upper bound on the government’s willingness to 
pay:  the sum of producer surplus under the patent system and the 
deadweight loss eliminated by placing the patent into the public domain.  
If the purchase price does not exceed this figure, the direct effects of the 
purchase still create a Pareto improvement.173 This is a natural upper 
bound to use in guiding our discussion, and we therefore adopt it.174 
Within this range, the exact purchase price is generally indeterminate 
under economic theory.175 
Within this range, the closer that the government can keep the 
price to the profits the innovator will earn under the patent system—i.e., 
the lower the price is within this range—the more the optional patent 
purchase system will preserve the market incentives of the patent system.  
Lower prices also have the added benefit of reducing the amount of money 
that the government must raise to fund the purchase; since these funds are 
raised through market-distorting taxes, this is a significant benefit.   
Thus, the closer the government can keep the agreed-on price to its 
valuation, the better.  The question then becomes how effective a 
negotiator the government is likely to be.  Since private companies exist 
with the purpose of making profits, while the government does not, there 
are good ex ante reasons to believe that private actors will have the edge in 
these discussions.  The defense industry may be the industry whose 
structure is the most analogous,176 and this may not be the most 
encouraging example.177 
Nonetheless, the two cases are not identical, and there may be 
some cause for optimism.  First, it is worth noting that there is an 
additional reason why a patent holder may find the notion of selling her 
patent to the government to be an attractive option.  By selling to the 
government at a fixed price, a patent holder assures herself a given amount 
of profit.  Were she to sell her product in the marketplace, while her 
 
172 If the government only offers to purchase the patent for a price lower than this 
amount, the owner will be better off by refusing to sell and earning monopoly profits in 
the marketplace.   
173 This does not include the deadweight loss from taxes, nor does it include all of the 
benefits from the purchase’s ameliorative secondary effects.    
174 Of course, other upper bounds are possible and reasonable choices; the amount it 
would cost the government to achieve the same result through a subsidy, for example.   
175 This range has many names; the Zone of Possible Agreement, the Zone of Positive 
Agreement, etc.  See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES (1983).  
176 I.e. one in which a private corporation is the only source of a particular product, and 
the government is the only buyer.   
177 See, e.g., Matt Kelley & Jim Drinkard, Secret Military Spending Gets Little Oversight,
USA TODAY, Nov. 9, 2005, at A1 (“The [Pentagon’s classified] budget has long been a 
repository for spending . . . .”); id. (“[W]ithin the defense industry, ‘there is a coziness 
that sometimes builds up.[’]”).    
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expected profit would be comparable, she would also face a higher degree 
of risk.  To the extent that patent holders are risk-averse, then, the 
government buyout will be increasingly appealing, and this will give the 
government additional leverage in negotiations.178 
Much more importantly, while the government can only buy any 
given patent from a single purchaser, it is worth remembering that the 
government’s goal is not to purchase any particular patent.  Its goal is to 
increase social welfare, and patent purchasing is merely a means by which 
it seeks to achieve this end.  From the government’s perspective, then, 
every patent is, in an important sense, a substitute for every other 
patent.179 As the agency in charge of purchasing patents will have a 
limited budget, there is good cause for concluding that the market for 
patent sales is far more competitive than it might initially appear.180 The 
fungible nature of utility, combined with these budget constraints, 
provides good reason to believe that the government may well be a much 
more effective negotiator than one might initially suspect.   
But, even if the government is a relatively poor negotiator, 
ultimately this may not be overly troubling.  If the government buys 
patents at prices approaching the upper bound of the range we have 
established—the sum of producer surplus and deadweight loss under 
monopoly—then, under the same economic assumptions as before, the 
government will still have successfully achieved the competitive 
equilibrium while paying approximately one-third of what it would have 
cost to accomplish the same result with a subsidy.  This would also create 
stronger incentives for innovation, as patent holders would now make 
significantly more than they did under patent alone.  This might result in 
the development of more technologies than would be developed under the 
current system, each of which would convey additional consumer and 
producer (and hence social) welfare.  Even if no new technologies were 
developed as a result, at the end of the day consumers would net the same 
utility as they do under patent, minus the deadweight loss they bear from 
the additional taxes, and this may not be very large.  These factors suggest 
that this problem is neither as important nor as troubling as it might 
initially seem.  
 
178 Similarly, if patentholders are risk-loving, they will find the government buyout 
comparatively unattractive.  If patentholders are risk-neutral, they will care only about 
their expected profit, not about the possible variation in that profit.   
179 Although, to the extent that patents interrelate, many patents will also be complements 
to other patents.    
180 On the other hand, the same is true of the defense industry, at least to some extent.  
That said, if the government’s goal in patent purchasing is to maximize its citizens’ 
utility, then patents may be interchangeable to a greater extent than rifles and ships and 
planes are.    
51
A more frightening specter than the fear of inaccurate government 
patent bidding is the potential for corruption in, or other regulatory capture 
of, the administrative body empowered to make offers to purchase patents.  
A corrupt patent czar could literally fritter away billions of taxpayer 
dollars on worthless patents.  Though a frightening possibility, 
administrative law has long dealt with this problem, and with care it can 
be prevented.  Control of the agency could be diffused across a committee, 
which would be more expensive to control and make any attempt at 
bribery riskier.  All members could be forbidden from working for any 
company whose patents they reviewed for a period of years after their 
tenure of office.  These and other measures, combined with the highly 
public nature of the agency’s activity and appropriate accompanying 
scrutiny, should be sufficient to ensure that acquisitions are carried out 
with the good of the public in mind.   
 
VI. A NOTE OF CAUTION, AND A GOOD PLACE TO START 
It is worth stressing that the optional patent purchase system is an 
evolution of the existing patent system, and not a revolution, as a prize 
system would be.  Patent purchasing is a policy mechanism that should be 
used sparingly.  Patent is not a broken system, and the optional patent 
purchase system is not designed to supplant it, but to augment it.   
In an excellent paper, John Duffy argued that much of the current 
debate over patent and prize systems mirrors an earlier debate begun by 
Hotelling, who advocated government intervention in decreasing-
marginal-cost industries (i.e., natural monopolies, such as utilities and 
transportation) and ultimately won by Coase.181 While her paper is 
directed toward prize systems, and not an optional patent purchase regime, 
it makes a persuasive case for skepticism in the face of calls to fix market 
marginal cost deficiencies through government intervention.  While most 
of these issues have been discussed throughout the course of this paper, it 
is worth reiterating that private entities are not powerless to overcome 
market inefficiencies.182 Moreover, for all of the salutary effects that 
accompany a patent purchase, it is still important to remember that the 
funds to purchase the patent must be raised through increased taxation, 
which creates inefficiencies of its own.183 Thus, a patent purchase should 
be a rare occurrence, and should be limited to helping the patent system 
better accommodate the cases for which it is most poorly suited—i.e., 
those areas where the negative secondary effects of patent are particularly 
pronounced.     
 
181 See Duffy, supra note 17. 
182 For example, a patent holder can reduce the amount of deadweight loss resulting from 
her monopoly by becoming a more perfect monopolist.   
183 See id. at 42.   
52
One area that patent purchasing might be particularly useful is the 
pharmaceutical industry.  First, the pharmaceutical industry is heavily 
reliant on patent, so every new drug is potentially available for 
government purchase.  One of the main reasons for this dependence is the 
existence of a large number of competitive firms that are capable of 
producing the drug; thus, placing the patent into the public domain would 
likely result in enough producers of the drug to achieve competitive 
pricing.   
Second, pharmaceutical patents are heavily interrelated.  Drugs are 
frequently prescribed and administered with complementary medications; 
a good example is the “cocktail” of medications, AZT, 3TC, and 
efavirenz, that are prescribed for patients who are diagnosed with HIV.184 
These relationships can lead to serious problems stemming from the 
secondary effects of patent.  For example, as discussed in Part III.B, 
supra, a staggering amount of current spending on pharmaceutical 
research is devoted to the development of so-called “me-too” drugs, drugs 
whose properties are identical to drugs that have already been developed, 
but that are still subject to patent.185 The uncertainty costs of patent are 
also higher than they are in many other areas.  Pharmaceutical patents are 
litigated more often than those of any other technology, and their litigation 
cost is particularly high.186 
Third, the pharmaceutical industry is dominated by large, publicly 
traded corporations, which means that there is a great deal of private 
expertise, in the form of capital market analysts, for the government to 
draw upon in making its valuation decision.  Additionally, because of the 
extensive regulatory filings that are required before a new drug can be 
approved by the Food and Drug Administration, much can be deduced 
about a drug patent’s value before it enters the market.  These same filings 
also make it easier to spot complementary and substitute patents further up 
the research pipeline than would normally be possible.  Thus, analysts will 
have a great deal of information with which to estimate patents’ value, 
and, accordingly, there is greater reason to expect that their valuations will 
be accurate.187 
The combination of these factors—many firms, to ensure 
competitive pricing, strong relationships between products that make 
secondary effects particularly important, and the combination of a deep 
 
184 See, e.g., Steve Sternberg, Anti-HIV ‘Cocktail’ Decided, USA TODAY, Dec. 10, 2003. 
185 See, e.g., Lansbury, supra note 39. 
186 Michael Meurer, Boston University Patent Rights and Licensing Symposium, 
available at http://www.bu.edu/law/scitech/volume6/Panel2.htm.  
187 It is also worth noting that there is a history of government involvement in the 
healthcare industry in ways that are not present in all industries.  It is also likely that a 
government program to purchase a prescription drug patent would be more politically 
acceptable than many other purchases might be.   
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pool of private expertise and available information that should enable 
accurate patent valuation—make pharmaceuticals an excellent sector for 
applying the optional patent purchase system.  Of course, these features 
are not unique to the pharmaceutical sector, and, similarly, every 
pharmaceutical patent should not be considered for purchase.  
Nonetheless, it would seem that pharmaceuticals could be an ideal field in 
which to begin implementing the optional patent purchase system.   
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The patent system, which has provided so many benefits to our 
society for so long, has been a great invention in its own right.  
Unfortunately, patent’s success has led to some of its problems; in those 
areas where technologies build off of and compete with each other the 
most intensely, patent creates remarkably poor incentives.  An optional 
patent purchasing system has great potential for ameliorating these 
deficiencies, and while such a system is not appropriate for all cases, 
judicious application could yield great benefits.  Though experimentation 
always prevents pitfalls, it would be the height of irony to eschew change 
based on a conclusion that the patent system itself is a final work that 
cannot be improved.   
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MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX 























We assume that the producer is profit-maximizing and has the 
capacity to manufacture the drug at a constant cost c per unit,188 where 
b
a
> c > 0.
A.  The Patent System 
 



















This corresponds to a monopoly price of:  






a > c, qm < q(c); the firm is wielding its monopoly power 
to lower output relative to the competitive market level in order to 
artificially raise the price.   









188 A constant marginal cost of production was chosen for multiple reasons; on large 
scales, the marginal cost of production is likely to rise very slowly, and it is both 
illustrative and analytically cleaner to use a constant function.  The basic conclusions of 
the model, however, are largely unchanged under almost any reasonable, non-
pathological cost function. 
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Note that C(pm) > 0.






























B.  Subsidy 
 
We now modify the framework of Part A to include a government 
subsidy, x, that the government pays to the monopolist for each unit that 
she sells.  The government’s goal is to achieve the competitive market 
outcome, and it chooses x accordingly.189 The cost of the subsidy is raised 
through taxes, so that total consumer surplus is equal to their utility from 
the good minus the cost of the subsidy.190 The monopolist’s profit, then, 
at ultimate sale price per unit p, is given by: 
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So, in order to achieve the competitive outcome, the government 
will choose x such that: 
 
189 One might fairly question whether it would be more appropriate for the government to 
select x in order to maximize consumer surplus, subject to the constraint x > 0.  However, 





, which is a downward-opening 





= . Thus, when consumers 
ultimately pay the cost of the transfer through taxes, consumer surplus is strictly 
decreasing with respect to the size of the transfer.  Choosing x so as to ensure the market 
outcome is helpful for our purposes because it facilitates comparison between the subsidy 
system and the patent and optional patent purchase systems.    
190 We do not consider the market-distorting effects of these taxes here.  Also, economic 
models of subsidy frequently assume that the cost of the subsidy is recovered by a lump 
sum tax on the producer, so that ultimately it is costless from the government’s 
perspective.  However, in real life, this is not a realistic option.  A more reasonable 
assumption is that the subsidy is paid for out of general tax revenues, which primarily 
come from the federal income tax.  Another reason that more traditional economic 
analyses do not focus on the source of the transfer payment is because distributional 
concerns are often neglected in the first instance, as they do not reduce the total amount 
of goods, only shift their ownership, and presumably distributional concerns can be 





Profit, C(q), is given by the product of the producer’s profit per unit 
and the quantity of units sold: 




Consumer surplus under a subsidy system is the same as that under 













Note that this is a negative number; under a subsidy system, 
consumers as a whole would actually be better off if the technology had 
never been developed.   
 
C.  The Optional Patent Purchasing System 
 
We now consider another modification to the model of Part A:  
The government, whose goal is to maximize consumer surplus,191 has the 
option of offering a payment, t, to the corporation in exchange for the 
rights to its patent.  If the corporation accepts the government’s offer, the 
government gives everyone the right to use the technology; we assume 
that the market is competitive, and that all other firms can manufacture the 
drug at the constant cost of c per unit, the same cost as the original firm.  
 
191 It should be stressed that this choice is a positive, not a normative one, as good 
policymaking should take into account the interests of producers as well as consumers.  It 
may be argued that the government should maximize total social welfare, the sum of 
consumer and producer surplus.  However, the model presented here does not include the 
welfare reductions from the taxes required to fund the transfer; focusing on consumer 
welfare helps to offset this failing.  Additionally, ignoring the distributive effects of the 
plan make the size of the transfer irrelevant; however, in reality the magnitude and 
direction of transfers is vastly important.  Further, such a social utility function would 
undercut an important facet of the plan, namely that it is potentially Pareto improving, 
making both consumers and producers strictly better off than they would be under the 
patent system.   
It is also worth considering whether, in a democracy where each citizen has only 
one vote, one may well expect that the policies that would be chosen are those that are 
supported by the most number of people, not those that provide the most social benefit.  It 
is unlikely that a majority of the national electorate will have a sufficiently large stake in 
the fortunes of any particular pharmaceutical company to outweigh the change in utility 
they receive in the form of consumer surplus.  Therefore, consumer surplus will dominate 
the government’s decision.  However, to the extent that one believes in the power of 
corporate lobbying or public ignorance, this justification may fairly be called into 
question.   
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If the corporation does not accept the government’s offer, they retain their 
patent rights and the analysis is identical to that of Part A.     
We assume that consumers ultimately bear the cost for the 
payment t through their tax dollars, and as such we subtract t from 
consumer surplus if the corporation accepts the government’s offer.   












































Note that the right hand side of this inequality is always positive, so no 
matter what the values of a, b, and c, there is some range of transfer values 
for which consumers are strictly better off.   
 We now consider the producer’s surplus if she accepts the 
government’s offer, given by: 
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Thus both parties’ utility can be strictly improved relative to their 









3 2 . This corresponds to between 1.0 
and 1.5 times the firm’s expected profit from monopoly pricing.  Because 
we assume that the government is attempting to maximize consumer 




)( 2 . However, it is 
useful to consider the full range of Pareto-improving transfer payments.   
 
D.  Cournot Duopoly 
 
We now adapt the framework of Part A slightly to incorporate two 
producers, firm one and firm two, both of which are rational profit-
maximizers, and whose products are perfect substitutes for each other.  
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Firm one’s profit is then given by: 
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Therefore, at equilibrium: 










Firm one’s profit is then: 























Deadweight loss can be calculated as: 







E.  Subsidy Under Cournot Duopoly 
We now modify the model of Part D to include a government 
subsidy, x, that the government pays to each duopolist for each unit that 
she sells.  The government’s goal is to achieve the competitive market 
outcome, and it chooses x accordingly.192 Firm one’s profit function thus 
becomes: 
( ) 1111 )()( qxcqpq +=

This is maximized when: 
 














Therefore, at equilibrium, 
EQUATION E1 ( ) 21 3 q
bxbcaq =+=
In order to achieve the competitive outcome, the government will 















Producer surplus then becomes: 
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